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The major tensions in the political philosophy of Walter
Lippmann are not difficulties unique to him. Instead, Lippmann's
work reflects deep-seated tensions within the American tradition.
These tensions are: (1) Standards cannot be set solely by reference
to either the material or the ideal realm. Instead, the two
realms must be continually related and an always changing
equilibrium struck between than. (2) Modernity (which could be
summarized as liberalism, capitalism and the scientific outlook)
is a double-edged sword: It provides and protects, yet it also
corrodes and alienates. Modernity makes a nation wealthy and
powerful, but corrupts its citizenry with expediency, opportunism
and drift. The modem citizen typically adopts a non-teleological
view of the universe, yet retains a teleological view of human
existence. (3) There is no settled view of human nature, of the
needs and desires of humanity. Human nature is at one point
regarded as innately opposed to civil order, while at another.it
is the very foundation of the highest Values of civility. The
acquisitive, self-interested and domineering individual is
lauded in one setting but condemned in another.
lippmann's work guides political thinkers to these issues,
issues that remain unresolved today. Lippmann's attempt: to
resolve these matters was not satisfactory, primarily because .
he approached these problems with a foregone preference for the
existing order. He preferred hierarchy and stability to equality
and change. Standing against idealists and radicals, he assigned
primacy to the past, rather than the future. He searched not for
meaning or purpose; instead, he sought authority. He saw the
unresolved tensions of American political philosophy not as
questions in need of answers but as the burning call for the
establishment of an authority that could resolve disruptions
caused by these tensions. He searched for an authority that would
be vested in the hands of an elite which was dedicated to the
gentle treatment of the status quo.

For Judy Ann McIntyre

The glance of an ideal love is terrible and glorious,
foreboding death and immortality together.
-*-■ George Santayana
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INTRODUCTION

Walter Lippmann was neither.a political theorist nor a
philosopher, according to his preeminent biographer, Ronald
Steel. Of Lippmann's most famous works of political philosophy,
Steel has this to say: The Good Society is plagued by
"confusion;"1 Essays in the Public Philosophy never overcomes "a
disturbing vagueness."2 "Lippmann's great talent lay in analysis
and explanation, not in theorizing," states Steel.3 Again,
referring to The Public Philosophy, which many of Lippmann's
readers had hoped would be his definitive work, Steel concludes:
"He could analyze situations with finesse and give off brilliant
flashes of illumination. Yet when he tried to use these powers to
mold a coherent philosophy, he stumbled...."4 Lippmann, states
Steel, "did not form patterns like a philosopher."^
This thesis supports Steel's contention that Lippmann's work
was contradictory. Section I shows that Lippmann, on the one
hand, condemned Marxist determinism as "fatalistic," yet, on the
other, espoused the "inexorable historic necessity" of his own
theory of economic determinism. Section II shows that Lippmann
argued both that natural law provides normative principles and
that natural law is simply the sum of those principles necessary
for order and convenience. Section II also documents Lippmann's
transition from one who believed there are no eternal principles
to one who argued for the existence of objectively knowable moral

-2i

truths. Section III finds yet another twist to Lippmann's
thought. It shows that in Public Opinion Lippmann argues that it
is impossible, in principle, for humans to know the world as it
really is. Instead of knowing objective reality, people create
and act upon a continually revised, counterfeit reality.
Yet, despite these major difficulties

(and this thesis

exposes several others), Lippmann is nonetheless ranked among the
prominent American political philosophers. Clinton Rossiter and
James Lare, for instance, hold that Lippmann was "first of all a
political thinker," "a person of immense influence in clarifying
.the values and shaping the policies of two generations of
Americans." Are Rossiter and Lare simply wrong when they describe
Lippmann as a thinker "who speaks not only to the living but also
to generations unborn" on the "ethical and social problems that
have been with us in the West from the beginning and will be with
us to the end...."?6
This thesis proposes that one can accept the philosophical
shortcomings of Walter Lippmann and still find him a political
philosopher. This is true because the problems in the political
philosophy of Walter Lippmann reflect problems in American
political thought.
The politics of Lippmann,

like the politics of much of

America, is conservative in its view of human nature, yet liberal
in its faith in human institutions; it is absolutist in its faith
in the rule of law, yet materialist and relativist in its view of
history and society.

-3In Lippmann's ideas, as in America's, the essential parts do
not always fit. Lippmann, for instance, had a love-hate
relationship with modernity. He did not deny its potency and
munificence as the provider for humanity. The scientific method
and the divisin of labor brought wealth and power, he argued,
strengthening a nation against its external enemies. Yet,
Lippmann also warned that modernity made a nation's citizens
vulnerable to attack from within: Where there should be citizens
with shared values and goals, there are ethical weaklings or
self-righteous bullies, and there is a pervasive anomie. Where
there should be leadership, there is expediency, opportunism and
drift.
Lippmann would have suffered modernity's eclipse of the
values of the past, had modernity produced satisfactory values of
its own. But he was convinced that it did not, and that left him
nowhere to turn. When one distrusts the future, as Lippmann did,
and lives among people who disavow their past, as Americans do,
there is no refuge from the present, there is no source
of strength other than the present.
If Lippmann had believed modernity could bring into being a
new humanity, if he had not concluded that human nature is
innately opposed to civil order, then perhaps he would have found
a redemptive future anticipated in the present. If Lippmann had
found a clear set of shared ideals among the American people,
then perhaps he could have made his argument for civility in
secular and human terms, instead of resorting to divinity.

-4Lippmann had difficulties perceiving shared ideals among the
American people because his own ideals were so problematic.
Lippmann aimed to avoid dogmatism -- and to a certain extent,
idealism —

because he believed it would cut him off from the

changing environment. Steel's biography of Lippmann is indeed the
chronicle of a realist who tried to adjust his ideals to the
qualitative and quantitative changes of "the American century."
To Lippmann, preserving the capacity to adjust to changing
circumstances is the key to being a "progressive."
Yet, no matter how frequently he adjusted his views of
social reality, no matter how willing he was "to jettison old
ideas as soon as new ones were at h a n d , " ^ Lippmann succumbed to
the pressure to freeze some basic parts of his world view. This
resulted in the conservative determinism examined in Section I.
His open-ended pragmatism solidified, despite his avowed
intentions.
Those supporters of Lippmann who see no philosophical
inadequacies in his work have subconsciously closed one eye to
problems like these. Where Lippmann saw necessity, universality
and morality, they see the same. They do not question the fit
between his historicism and his absolutism, between his
pragmatism and his natural law. They accept his a priori
understandings. Like him, they have reified, certain aspects of
the existing order.
Those critics who dwelled on the philosophical shortcomings
and inconsistencies in Lippmann's work were, from his

-5perspective, missing the point. He regarded the intricacies of
intellectual work as far removed from the realities of politics:
"For what operates in history is not the systematic idea as
genius framed it, but shifting imitations, replicas,
counterfeits, analogies, and distortions in individual minds."®
Lippmann is partially correct in this assessment of the
American public —

it does judge ideas by their consequences, not

by their theoretical niceties. However, as Lippmann learned later
in his life, that sort of pragmatic attitude should not be
blindly encouraged: To do so is most likely to result in a
complete denial of the ideal, to do so is to further cynicism and
decay.
To a large extent, the philosophical lapses, the turn-abouts
and the internal inconsistencies of Lippmann'S work can be .
attributed to his pragmatic desire for a tight fit between the
ideal and the real. As shown in Sections I and III, Lippmann
tended to achieve this fit by bending the ideal to the real, not
vice versa.

In Public Opinion, in particular, he flatly denied

the significance and the constancy of the ideal. As Sections I
and III show, Lippmann believed the real, not the ideal, is what
endures —

endures not in its specific embodiments, but endures

as a massive causal force, as an entity which overwhelmingly
outweighs the ideal.
On the balance, however, Lippmann —

like America —

never

entirely abandons the ideal. Steel is correct when he states:

-6He was a skeptic who yearned for an
overvaulting sense of order he feared did
not exist.... He was a realist who never
quite suppressed his youthful romanticism
and idealism — qualities that saved him
from negativism and cynicism in his old
age. ^
The same

could be said of America's wellspring of idealism: It is

not even

close to running dry. Those leaders with the most

powerful followings always draw heavily upon it. If the body
politic is to be moved, both its idealistic and its realistic
sides must be touched. There are, of course, those who cynically
manipulate the idealistic side of the American character,
justifying self-serving police actions in the Caribbean and
Central America, for example, with statements about preserving
the abstract freedom of America's neighbors. As such rhetoric
indicates, the content of America'

ideals remains totally

unsettled.
This is where the work of political philosophers
historians and
important.

(and

humanists in general) becomes crucially

In this respect, Lippmann's work is disturbing: He

operates under a foreshortened understanding of the ideal, and he
is all too willing to abandon even this truncated view of the
ideal. Lippmann remained idealistic, for example, not about human
nature, but about humanity's ability to repress and contain human
nature. As is discussed in Section II, he grew increasingly
pessimistic about the gut stuff of humanity, referring to "our
natural and uncivilized selves,"10 and to "the primitive and
persistent impulse to dominate, to submit, to stand in awe of

power and to seek its protection."-*--*- As is shown in Section III,
his doctrine of natural law is founded not on the natural
impulses of humanity, but on what he saw as the need to civilize
those impulses. From this outlook it is merely a short step to
Lippmann's egoistic, elitist social view. He prescribed
heavyhanded institutions to keep the uncivilized multitudes in
check. Since he regarded the natural individual as aggressive,
selfish and immature, he saw the masses as a destructive force
that must be contained, not as a redemptive force to be
liberated. The exceptional few, the moral and intellectual elite,
would be the caretakers of the relatively static institutional
restraints placed upon the masses.
This conservative view of human nature is not, obviously,
the only outlook found in American political theory. There are
those, and the younger and more liberal Lippmann was among them,
who regard humanity's natural desires as potentially positive
forces. Young Lippmann believed that the natural yearnings of
people should be satisfied, that liberal institutions should
strive to fulfill human desires. Yet Lippmann's view of this
process omitted a crucial step. He gave no philosophical
attention to the ideal fruit for which liberal institutions
reach. This is, perhaps, the greatest shortcoming of Lippmann
(and of American political thought, as it is developed by him).
He failed in what Santayana calls "turning the friction of
material forces into the light of ideal goods. "-*-2 He denied the
natural, animal basis of the loftiest attainments of humanity. As

a young liberal, Lippmann accepted the desires of people —
he thought they should be satisfied directly,

but

in the material

world; he ignored the abstract and spiritual goal of those
desires. As an old conservative, Lippmann found an ideal in his
doctrine of natural law, but it was an ideal chosen explicitly
because it was irreconcilably opposed to the natural desires of
humanity.

Either way, Lippmann had nowhere meaningful to go. He

was without the guidance of substantial ideals.
Given his outlook he had no way to connect the natural
desires of humanity to its most sublime ideals —
ideals such as love.

For Lippmann,

particularly to

ideals like love must remain

bound to the material world. There is no resurrection or
immortality possible for them. Their object is hopelessly
grounded in the real world.
As will be evident below, Lippmann should be remembered more
for his voyage than for the particular destinations that he
reached. He explored and reflected tensions deep within American
political thought. That he elucidated so many tensions is no mean
feat. That he failed to resolve them is not grounds to dismiss
him as a thinker. He did sincerely desire to make of them a
single piece. That he clung too tightly to the past and the
present, to the material and the real, is indeed a failure —
it is a failure that is understandable, given the context of mainstream American political thought.
It should not be forgotten that Lippmann argued for
philosophy,

not simply because he believed it to be a pleasant

but

-9accompaniment to private life, but because he believed it to be a
necessary aspect of public life. It is the task of others to
continue this argument, and in so doing, to find the resurrection
that Lippmann denied.

I.

- A.

ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

Introduction
It is axiomatic among academics that there is no surer

way for a foe to deliver himself to his enemies than for him
to write a book.

Lippmann, who put more than ten million

words in print, never denied his critics their deliverance.
Of the lot, there was one book so rife with difficulties
that it served his critics at least as well as his admirers.
The book, The Good Society

(1937), brought predictable

derision from the "left."

Lewis Mumford

Lippmann's anti-collectivism)

(a target of

found within The Gdod Society

"confusions and contradictions...so massive as to be
intellectually discreditable in a man of his attainments."^
John Dewey thought the book gave "encouragement and practical
support to reactionaries" and described it as "liberalism
m

„2
a vacuum."
Lippmann's biographer Ronald Steel, who also used the

words "confusion" and "contradictions" to describe the book,
said it suffered a "split personality."

3

On its face,

Steel's description is correct; however, as will be shown,
there is a strong theme throughout the book, a theme which
Steel's interpretation obscures.
The first part of The Good Society argued that all
collectivism —

which, as Lippmann -defined it, included
- 10 -

-11communism, fascism, and the New Deal -—

is inherently

totalitarian because it requires economic planning.

4

In sharp contrast, the second part of The Good Society
was nothing less than an enthusiastic primer for interventionist,
welfare state liberalism.
up a blueprint —

Lippmann, stated Steel,

"drew

including public works, social insurance,

and the abolition of monopolies —

that was not very different

from what FDR had been trying to achieve with the New Deal."^
Dicey, Mises and von Hayek, all of whom Lippmann cited
approvingly in the first half of the book, would have been
appalled by Lippmann's conclusion.
Early in The Good Society Lippmann stated, "To the
liberal mind, the notion that men can authoritatively plan
and impose a good life upon a great society is ignorant,
impertinent and pretentious."

Collectivism is a throwback,

he argued; it necessarily accompanies an earlier mode of
production. Modern industrial production requires a division
of labor and a market economy, neither of which is compatible,
he asserted, with collectivism or planning.

The state can

force collectivism upon a modern society, but such an
arrangement will only temporarily postpone the inevitable.
Collectivism is doomed to pass away.

This process, Lippmann

insisted in The Good Society, is a "truly inexorable
historic necessity."

7

Steel disagreed pointedly with Lippmann's economic
explanation of totalitarianism.

"His analysis," Steel charged,

"assumed that economic collectivism produced totalitarianism,

-12g

when, in fact, it was the other way around."

Lippmann kept

looking for the economic basis, wrote Steel, because "he
wanted to believe that political and economic liberalism
went hand in hand."

9

Steel, who seemed determined to offer his own views of
totalitarianism (he claimed its roots lie in "the emotional
appeal of mass movements with their mass loyalties and
mass enthusiasms"),1^ .. .......
distinction:

passed right over a crucial

Walter Lippmann did not "want to believe that

political and economic liberalism went hand in hand," he
believed it.

More specifically, Lippmann argued repeatedly

that political and civic liberty were brought into being by
economic liberalism.

In A Preface to Morals

(1929) he stated:

our great-grandfathers.... found themselves in a world
regulated by the customs and beliefs of a landed society.
They could not operate their factories successfully in
such a society, and they rebelled fiercely against the
customs which restricfed them.
That rebellion was
rationalized in the philosophy of laissez-faire which
meant in essence that machine industry must not be
interfered with by landlords ahd peasants who had feudal
fights, nor by governments which protected those rights.
On the positive side this rebellion expressed itself
in declarations of the rights of man.
These declarations
were a denial of the vested rights of men under the old
landed order and an assertion of the rights of men,
particularly the new middle-class men, who proposed to
make the most of the new industrial and mechanical
order.H
Similarly, in The Good Society Lippmann wrote that the
"ideal of equal and certain laws," a bulwark of modern
liberalism,

"is hardly conceivable in an age of small,

self-sufficient communities."

12

As these two examples

indicate, it can be shown that a powerful economic

-13determinism underlay the political philosophy of Walter
Lippmann.
Steel failed his readers by refusing to explore Lippmann's
position on this issue.

Every time Lippmann’s determinism

became so pronounced that Steel could not ignore it, he
briefly noted Lippmann's contention, rebutted it, then passed
on to another topic.
according to Steel,

Lippmann argued in A Preface to Morals,
"that fascism and Bolshevism resulted

from the 'breakdown of a somewhat primitive form of capitalism."
Eight years later in The Good Society Lippmann, in Steel's
words,

"had modified h is argument to put the blame for

totalitarianism on collectivism rather than on industrial
backwardness.

But he still sought the cause in economics."

13

Instead of pursuing the matter, Steel dismissed it, saying
that Lippmann did not understand "the emotional appeal of
either fascism or communism....

In truth the appeal of

authoritarianism reflected a side of human nature he was
loath to recognize."

14

Steel's interpretation belied all

that he wrote abo u t ‘Lippmann's insistence upon the irrational
aspects of humanity.

Furthermore, Steel ignored the fact

that Lippmann explicitly argued in The Method of Freedom that
that the economy created the emotional, herdlike masses that
Steel claimed Lippmann did not acknowledge:

"This submerging

of individualism in mass behavior is the consequence of the
increasing complexity of the economic order."

15

Lippmann

also argued in The Method of Freedom that the loss of

-14economic security during the Depression drove men to an
"overwhelming p a s s i o n . "

"The surrender of liberty, the

disenchantment with democracy, the revival of autocracy,"
all are manifestations of the desire to bring stability
to the world economy.

16

Although Lippmann's economic determinism had its
internal inconsistencies, it was a consistent feature of
his work.

In Drift and Mastery he stated that the "desire

for self-government" arose "with the accumulation of a great
surplus of wealth.... It wasn't easy to think much of the
possibilities of this world while he jmanj lived on the edge
17
of starvation."

Elsewhere in the same book he maintained

that only when society has emerged from "a fear economyI?
will people be able to live in security and happiness.

18

In

The Good Society he argued that the social order must be
adapted "to the economy brought into being by the industrial
revolution...."

19

In the broadest terms Lippmann's economic determinism
held that the mode of production (a) proceeds through definite
historical stages and (b) is the locus of certain relations
that determine the scope of human affairs, particularly
political, cultural and intellectual affairs.
Since one thinker's name dominates all discussion of
this interpretation of history and society, it is necessary —
before proceeding —

to examine Lippmann's views of that

man who was born in Trier, Prussia, 71 years before Lippmann
was born on Lexington Avenue in New York City.

-15B.

The Name That Launched a Thousand Arguments
In the course of his work, Lippmann quoted and paraphrased

arguments and observations from an extremely broad range of
sources: classical philosophers, their translators and
interpreters, political theorists and activists, psychoanalysts,
novelists, economists, social critics and theologians, artists
and art critics, biographers, historians, poets and politiicians.
His was an impressively eclectic, restless bibliography.
Among all these sources, one figure was treated most
curiously.

This person appeared repeatedly in the text of

Lippmann's major books, disappeared for a while, then
tirelessly returned for another engagement.
Karl Marx.

The person was

His ideas were the springboard that launched many

a Lippmann argument:

When Marx went down, Lippmann went up.

Yet for all of this, there was a conscious refusal to treat
Marx's ideas systematically.

20

The "Marxian tradition" and

a few selected quotes hover throughout the text —
Lippmann's first major book to the last ■—

from

but Marx himself

was never treated seriously:
For the study of politics I should say
that it is more important to know what
leaders, stump speakers, pamphleteers,
meant, than to know what he said.
For
dealing with living ideas.21

unhesitatingly
socialist
think Marx
then you are

It could be argued that his statement was nothing more than
the tip of Lippmann's pragmatist view of the world.

He

judged ideas not by the purity of their pedigree or elegance
of argument, but by their consequences.

That would be a

plausible explanation, but Marx was the only major thinker

-16dismissed in this fashion by Lippmann.

Lippmann did not

suggest that it is more important to know what the people
of Athens thought of Aristotle than to know what Aristotle
himself said.

The same claim, if made about the authors of

The Federalist or other seminal works of American political
theory, would be hooted out of the ballpark, of political
science.

(This is not to deny that the received view of

a thinker plays an important role in a full understanding,
but it is to say that without the original text there is
nothing to understand, no basis for subsequent interpretation
and clarification.)
Lippmann's attitude reduced M a r x ’s work to a sort of
assumption.

What was taken for granted by Lippmann, the

reader never know;s.

Steel reported that the young Lippmann

"read The Communist Manifesto and some of Karl Marx's
shorter essays," but disliked what he found there.

22

From

this and Lippmann's extremely limited references to
specific passages in Marx and Engels, one might safely
conclude that Lippmann based his tireless critique

(and

mis-plagiarism?) on a minute introduction to the actual thing.

C.

Lippmann's Attack on Marx's Economic Determinism
Lippmann’s critique of Marx began in A Preface to

Politics, his first book.

He reduced Marxism to two concepts:

First, "we are the creatures of economic conditions," and
second,

"a war of classes is being fought everywhere in

which the proletariat will ultimately capture the industrial

-17machinery and produce a sound economic life as the basis of
peace and happiness for all."

23

The "singlemindedness" of

the Marxist approach "has done good service." It has "helped
men to think socially," turned their attention from the
romantic view of history and "engendered a fine concern about
average people, about the voiceless multitudes who have
been left to pass unnoticed."

24

This constituted the essence

and nearly the entirety of Lippmann's complimentary remarks
about Marx.

(The young Lippmann, riding high perhaps on his

brief fling with the avant garde of Greenwich Village,
referred to Marx as the political thinker who had exercised
the greatest influence in the western world.)
In A Preface to Politics Lippmann denounced "economic
determinism" as a "disastrous" creed "when it comes time to
act.... You are likely to wait for something to determine
you. Personal initiative and individual genius are poorly
25
regarded."
Further, "the philosophy of class warfare....
can be effective only so long as the working class is without
sovereignty.

But no sooner has it achieved power than a new
2g

outlook is needed in order to know what to do with it...."
In Public Opinion Lippmann assailed the "economic interpretation
of history" as an "instinctive fatalism...."

27

He claimed

that Marxism errs when it claims "that men's economic
position would irresistibly produce a clear conception of
their economic interests."

28

That is wrong, argued Lippmann,

because "nothing is more certain than that all classes of

-18men are in constant perplexity as to what their interests
are.

, ,29

Before proceeding, it must be made clear that Lippmann
reduced "economic determinism" to a very narrow concern.
Gone was M a r x 's argument about the historical development
of the modes of production, gone was Marx's dialectical
relationship between the base and superstructure.^

Reading

Lippmann's text symptomatically, one might hypothesize that
this omission indicates Lippmann's basic acceptance of these
points.

As will be shown, this hypothesis finds supportive

evidence in Lippmann's later works.
Lippmann's critique of economic determinism focused
exclusively on what might be called vulgar Marxian psychology.
If Marx and Lenin were correct, wrote Lippmann, economic
position ought to not only "divide mankind into classes, but
to supply each class with a view of its interest and a
coherent policy for obtaining it."

31

This notion, Lippmann

said, rests on the mistaken Marxian assumption
that men are capable of adopting only one version of
their interest, and having adopted it, they move
fatally to realize it.... That assumption is false.
A class interest can be conceived largely or narrowly,
selfishly or unselfishly, in the light of no facts,
some facts, many facts, truth and error.32
"A man's various economic contacts," wrote Lippmann, "limit
or enlarge the range of his opinions.

But which of the

contacts, in what guise, on what theory, the materialistic
conception of politics cannot predict.M

33

-19Lippmann acknowledged that a "man's various economic
contacts limit or enlarge the range of his opinions," and
he agreed with the notion that men who work at machines
will tend to interpret experience differently from handicraftsmen
or traders.

He agreed that James Madison was correct in

saying in Federalist No. 10 that men are divided into factions
"by their relation to p r o p e r t y H o w e v e r , Lippmann continued,
Madison "does not say that their property and their
opinions are cause and effect,, but that differences of
property are the causes of differences of opinion."
■'

are many other causes of opinion.

There

34

Lippmann's attack on "economic determinism," therefore,
can be reduced to two major contentions:

(1) Since Lippmann

believed there is no such thing as a direct and unvarying
connection between reality and human response (this contention
is explored in Section III), he maintained that it is factually
wrong to claim that the economy directly determines action
or opinion.

Instead, individuals adjust their actions or

opinions in response to their individual experience of the
environment.

Since individuals' experience differ, Lippmann

maintained at this point that the experience of the economic
environment does not override the experience of other aspects
of the environment.

(2) Once people have perceived their

interest, "how they shall pursue it is not fatally determined...."
To believe that men will innately pursue a certain end is to
believe that.men possess what James called the "faculty of

35

acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without
foresight of the ends and without previous education in
the performance."

36

Lippmann believed, therefore, that "Marxian" determinism
counseled a fatalistic aloofness from the struggles of
the day.
...Karl Marx...undertakes to assure them, on the ground
of his dialectic, that the struggle between capitalist
and proletarian is the final conflict, that the issue
is rigid, the result pre-determined, and that under
communism man will 'leap from the kingdom of necessity
to that of freedom'....^7
People who prefer to trust destiny,

"a quick one or a slow

one," only seek to avoid "the whole task of judging events....
It is their aim "to escape the real effort of the imagination
38
which is to weave a dream into the turning present."

What

these people avoid is the development of self-consciousness,
the variable that determines whether people are "the victims
or masters of change."
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Those with "self-consciousness," then, are charged with
a special responsibility.

They must apply themselves, not

to the distant, utopian future, but to that graspable point
at which today turns into tomorrow.

This raises a distinction

which troubled Lippmann repeatedly when he proposed solutions
to the problems of the day.

Given the limits he placed on

human knowledge, and given his belief that the future is,
in James's phrase, pregnaant with "iffs," how far should the
individual or society go in judgments about the issues pf
the present?

To not step in is fatalism.

To step in with

-21undue certainty is to attempt the impossible, for m e n ’s actions
are merely interpositions in the flow of reality.

To believe

that one has imagined the future is to foreclose unforeseen
possibilities.

"In each child that is born there are

possibilities which no one can foresee.... That is why
liberty is one of the conditions of human progress," wrote
Lippmann.

"Without it the dead hand of the past is forever

upon the future."
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The political philosophy of Edmund Burke —
Lippmann thought highly —
of Lippmann here:

of whom

resonates throughout the views

There is a stolid resistance to any change

which is not founded on current circumstances and their
direct needs.

The limits of purposive activity, in

Lippmann's view, must be near at hand, lest one group —
generation —

or

claim a lofty role in history that pre-empts

a future generation or destroys the contribution of a past
generation.

Fear of such purposive activity, it could be

said, prompted Lippmann to resort to his own, peculiarly
quietistic, economic determinism.

D.

The Inexorable Economic Determinism of Walter Lippmann
The introduction to this section stated that the

economic determinism of Walter Lippmann consisted of the
following broad beliefs:

The mode of production (a) proceeds

through definite historical stages and

(b) is the locus of

certain relations that determine the scope of human affairs,
particularly political, cultural and legal affairs.

Although the shape of Lippmann's determinism resembled
a vulgar reading of Ma r x , Lippmann's specific categories
were typically mirror opposites of Marx's:

To Lippmann,

the proletariat was an unstable, potentially destructive
force; the property-owning middle class, in his estimation,
was the progressive force.

Lippmann believed a stable,

prosperous society would necessarily be based on the private
ownership of property, exemplified by the middle class
life of modern capitalist countries.
Throughout human history, contended Lippmann, there has
been an evolution or historical progression from One technique
of production to another.

The industrial age was preceded

by handicraft production, the "tillage of settled
agriculturists” by the "pastoral pursuits of nomadic tribes..*
Each productive technology brought into being an accompanying
mode of production or form of economic organization.

Slavery,

feudalism and laissez faire capitalism are all stages in the
development of the mode of production.

The industrial

revolution has "brought into being" a "new mode of production,
which is characterized by "the division of labor among
interdependent communities and individuals.
truly inexorable historic necessity."

This is the

42

Nothing can prevent the whole of mankind from being
drawn out of its ancestral isolation into the world-wide
economy of interdependent specialists.
For the new
mode of production is incomparably more efficient in
the struggle for survival. The men who adopt it not
only grow wealthier than those who do not, but they
overrun and dominate those who do not.^3

-23The distinguishing accomplishment of the division of labor
was the lifting of mankind beyond "a meagre and self-sufficing
•
’ ..44
existence.
Productive technology, continued Lippmann, eventually
shapes not only the mode of production but all other
institutions and even human nature itself.

The irresistible

progress of the mode of production has disrupted •"state, law,
property, family, church, human conscience, conceptions of
right and wrong, of status, of expectation, of need...."
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This "social heritage" has yet to catch up with the mode of
production, and thus there is "rebellion against the world
or renunciation of the world."
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Since the industrial

revolution
requires not only an alteration of the economy but a
readaptation of human nature and of usage, it will be
a long time before men have caught up with their
changing circumstances arid have acquired the necessary
knowledge to remake their habits and their institutions
accordingly.47
Lippmann called the way.of life brought into being by
the industrial revolution "liberalism."

(Though he took up

the cause of liberalism in The Good Society , it is important
to remember that Lippmann was —

in other works —

and repelled by the consequences of liberalism.)

frightened
"Behind

the liberal philosophy is the whole force of man's
commitment to the economy of the division of labor...."

The

"necessities of the mode of production" compel men to
discover and establish "the essential principles of a liberal
society.

-24One^ of the necessities of the modern mode of production
is the protection and utilization of individual genius.
Lippmann wrote,

For,

individual acts of invention and discovery

drive forward the technology of production.

By freeing

the genius from the all-consuming demands of self-sufficiency,
the division of labor allows the genius to expand human
knowledge.

Because others grew the food that, in Lippmann's

example, Galileo ate; because others made the clothes he
wore, Galileo was freed to study the heavens and earth.

To

do so he needed not only the division of labor but the
protection of liberalism, for the multitudes — 1 the others
within the division of labor — ■ constituted a threat to
his work.

Their irrational desires may have conflicted with

his work, and —
to a half.

if they were not restrained —

brought it

"When a Galileo is coerced by a more powerful

but a more ignorant inquisitor, his scientific genius is
arbitrarily leveled down to the obscurantism of his masters."
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To Lippmann the more powerful but more ignorant inquisitor
may be an individual tyrant or an absolutist cabal or a
mob, but in modern society it is most likely to be a duly
constituted majority.
interference —

Lippmann's liberalism forbade political

by the majority or otherwise —

with the

divis ion of labor.
Lippmann gave society no substantive purpose or overriding
goal —

beyond the preservation of the division of labor

and the individual freedoms which it created.

This is

Lippmann's chimera:

free to adjust

The individual is free —

-25to the elite-imposed definition of reality, free to adjust
to the compulsion of the economy, free to pursue the
objective truth, which is the truth that is workable within
the existing structure.
According to Lippmann, only liberalism is suitable to
the industrial society.

"There is no choice" between

liberalism and any other way of life
because men are committed to the division of
labor, and it is as impossible for them to live
by any other means as it was for their ancestors
in the villages clustered around regional market
towns to exist without a high degree of
self-sufficiency.
The "apparent choice" between the liberal order and any
other way of life is "subjective?"
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it "exists only in

the mind.... The choice does not exist when they £men]
come to find out what they can do."

52

Although maladjustments exist between liberalism
and the industrial mode of production,
There is no reason to think that the time has
come when the social order cannot adapt itself
to the economy brought into being by the
industrial revolution, and that, therefore,
men must destroy the new economy.
For that
would mean that the industrial revolution
itself had come to a dead e n d . 59

Lippmann's conclusion, thus, was a simple and —
viewpoint of the existing economy —

from the

optimistic one. Until

industrial productive forces have been fully developed, the
social order must adapt itself to the existing mode of
production. When there is no more room for development, the
social order will no longer be able to adapt itself to the mode
of production. That point has not been reached, and, according to
all the evidence Lippmann saw, it is far, far in the future.
The economic determinism of Walter Lippmann was, then,
a philosophy that counseled individuals to allow the unfolding of
the status quo and to trust in the decisions delivered by the
market.®® Unlike Marx, who found the potential of the future
alive within the present, Lippmann found the present bound
securely to the past. Lippmann's determinism was conservative
because the present and the past, rather than the future, were
assigned causal force and primacy.

E.

Leap from the Kingdom of Necessity to More Necessity

Lippmann held that it is not conscious choice but the
inexorable progress of the technology of production that
determines the mode of production. The consequences of the
industrial revolution, for instance, cannot be reversed "by an
act of will" or political coercion...."®-1- The existing mode of
production will be transformed only by a revolutionary change in
the technology of production.
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Until invention, which is as yet not even
within the speculative possibilities,
creates a more efficient and radically
different method of producing wealth,
mankind is committed to the division of
labor in a market economy.62
Given this view, it was wise of Lippmann to offer an
instrumental justification for the economy.

It was wise because,

according to the standard position on such matters, an end that
is inexorably determined cannot at the same time be a properly
ethical end. Therefore, an instrumental justification wins by
default. Lippmann justified the modern mode of production on the
grounds it is "incomparably more efficient," i.e., those who
adopt it grow "wealthier" and "overrun and dominate those who do
not."63 The Good Society consistently adhered to this argument.

...the basic economy of the division of
labor regulated in markets is a mode of
production, like village agriculture or
pastoral nomadism. Men may like it or
dislike
it.
That
is
an
aesthetic
preference, such as preferring the life of
a hunter or a shepherd to that of a farmer or
a factory worker. But a mode of production
cannot be judged to be fundamentally just
or unjust.
In short, Lippmann described.the economy as an amoral, seemingly
autonomous entity. Lippmann described the economy as neither the
conscious creation of individuals nor the work of some recognized
social authority. Thus, since economic compulsion is not willed
by any group or individual, Lippmann did not regard it as the
exercise of arbitrary authority.
Despite all the determinism Lippmann built into his society,
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he left one entry point for free choice —

the "subjective"

choice between liberalism and any other way of life.®5
Objectively, there is no choice as to which way of life is suited
to the modern mode of production. There is, however, a choice
that "exists only in the mind...."®® That is enough of a basis,
Lippmann believed, upon which to erect a standard of justice. The
adjustment of the legal, political and cultural institutions to
the mode of production can be judged in ethical terms, he
claimed. "Questions of justice can arise...out of maladjustment
of laws, institutions, education, and social custom to a
particular mode of production."®7
Liberalism, Lippmann maintained, adjusts the "laws,
institutions, education, and social custom" to the "mode of
production." Totalitarianism, Lippmann argued, tries to adjust
the economy to fit the law, institutions and customs —

but that,

he insisted, is impossible: The economy is the determinative
force. The modern economy,

like the modern environment described

in Section III, is too vast, too complex to be understood by
humans,

let alone consciously controlled. Lippmann held that

people consciously adjust the "fictions" of the legal, political
and cultural institutions to the economy.
The adjustment of the legal, political and cultural
institutions is the personal task of individuals with "a strong
desire" and "a growing capacity to be just...." They must be
guided by moral standards which discourage the quest for
privilege and the exercise of arbitrary power.®® Their goal is a

free society in which inequalities in the
condition of men, in their rewards, and in
their social status do not arise out of
extrinsic and artificial causes — out of
the physical power to coerce, out of legal
privilege, out of special prerogative, or
out of fraud, sharp practice, necessitous
bargaining.6 9
However, within the confines of Lippmann's economic
determinism, there existed no moral foundation upon which these
individuals could base their judgments.

(Section II shows how

Lippmann attempted to solve this dilemma by locating objectively
knowable values in his doctrine of natural law.) Within
Lippmann's economic determinism, no outside point of appeal
exists: Lippmann asserted that questions of justice should be
resolved according to the standard of the economy. The abolition
of poverty, for instance, which the young Lippmann described as
"the most immediate question before the world t o - d a y , s h o u l d
be accomplished by a redistribution of income which preserves
"the equilibrium of the exchange economy itself. "71Redistribution must be accomplished not through a "mere leveling
of incomes by taking from the rich and giving doles to the poor,
a process which eventually paralyzes and impoverishes the entire
economy, but through "measures which promote the efficiency of
the markets as regulators of the division of labor...."72 The
"true line of progress is not to impair or to abolish the market
but to maintain and improve it." The "uncompleted task" is "to
show how law and public policy may best be adapted to this mode
of production...."73
Given this circular arrangement, the question must finally
be asked: Did Lippmann do anything other than that for which he
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denounced Marx? Could one not readily conclude that Lippmann's
economic determinism is an "instictive fatalism," a "disastrous"
creed "when it comes time to act?"

-31-

II.

NATURAL LAW

"Like a harlot," states Danish philosopher Alf Ross, "natural
law is at the disposal of everyone. The ideology does not exist that
cannot be defended by an appeal to the law of nature." Natural law has
been used to defend reform, reaction and revolution.
Since
determined

Lippmann

rejected

by public

opinion

the
or

belief
by

the

that what
majority;

is

right

since

he

is
was

skeptical about all political dogma? and since he preferred hierarchy
and stability to equality and change, it is not surprising that he came
to advocate a conservative doctrine of natural law. Not only is the
content of Lippmann's natural law conservative, it has authoritarian
implications: Lippmann's natural law is knowable only by an elite.
"Not everyone," Lippmann states, can know natural law; "most people,
presumably, may have heard almost nothing about it."2
In broadest terms, natural law -- as distinct from Lippmann's
natural law —

can be capsulized as the appeal to God, nature or human

nature as the source of objective standards for ethics, politics and
law. ^ on the whole (although important exceptions exist), advocates
of natural law look for purposes in the world, either of God, humanity
or nature.

Natural

law theorists emphasize reason as humanity's

distinguishing characteristic and try to establish a set of moral
principles on which rational people can agree.
Lippmann was concerned neither with standard natural law issues,
nor with a consistent presentation of his views of natural law. In The
Good Society and The Public Philosophy he made all of he following

epistemological claims, without following any discernible pattern.
At times he claimed natural law is what is required for social order
and

convenience;^

at

times

he

stated

it

provides

normative

principles, it prescribes what behavior "should be."® At one point he
asserted it is not crucial whether natural law is "the commandment of
God or the reason of things. . . . . At another he argued that natural law
is

a

truth

"proclaimed

by

the

Christian

gospel....

recognition that there is in each man a final essence —
an immortal soul —

For

in the

that is to say,

which only God can judge, a limit was set upon he

dominion of men over men."^ At various other points he maintained
natural

law

is

known

through

experience,®

inquiry,"® and through i n t u i t i o n . I n
stated,

"It

is

there

objectively."

through

"rational

The Public Philosophy he
Thinkers

have

agreed,

he

continued, that it is "not something decided upon by certain men and
then proclaimed by them.
prejudice,

someone's

It was

wish

or

not

someone's

rationalization,

fancy,
a

someone's

psychological

experience and no more."11 in The Good Society he asserted that "this
higher law is...a progressive discovery of men striving to civilize
themselves. . .its scope and implications are a gradual revelation that
is by no means completed.
Lippmann's conception of natural law, thus, could be said to be
both classical and modern.1® Attributing it to the classical period,
he stated that its discovery "preceded the advance of modern science
and the industrial revolution," and that people have acted upon it for
"over two thousand years. . . ,"14 Yet in a distinctly modern argument,
he

stated

that

recognition

the natural

that

certain

law of

things

property

was

founded

"are not provided

on

the

in unlimited

-33quantity and without effort."^5 He acknowledged the "new school of
natural law, which flourished from about 1500 to 1800," but asserted
this school was unable "to cope with the pluralism of the later modern
age... ."I6 instead of trying to situate his view amidst classical and
modern natural law, he claimed there are "fundamental principles"
common to all schools of natural law. These principles are

in Cicero 's w o r d s , 1law is the bond of civil
s o c i e t y , ' and that all men, governors and
the governed, are always under, are never
above,
laws;
that these
laws can be
developed
and
refined
by
rational
discussion, and that the highest laws are
those upon which all rational men of good
will, when fully informed, will tend to
a g r e e .17

If one accepts this definition and puts aside the problems with
the derivation and substance of Lippmann's natural law, it is possible
to develop a preliminary sense of the role of Lippmann's natural law.
This role could be expressed in terms of a triadic relationship (an
heuristic

device

that

Lippmann

does

not

u s e ) . There

are

three

determining forces at work in the model: natural law, human nature and
circumstance. Lippmann regarded the unchanging part of human nature
as basically uncivilized. (This issue is taken up in detail later in
this section.) Lippmann described circumstance as almost stationary
for those millions of people outside the grasp of modernity, for those
people confined to the rhythms of primitive agriculture. With the
arrival of the scientific and industrial age, the human environment is
set to rocking. New circumstances, new objects, produce new reactions
from human impulse. With relentless force, history works "upon the
inner springs of being" and inevitably undermines the "premises of

-34c o n d u c t ."18 The triadic relationship loses its balance. The barbaric
tide seizes upon one of the three elements and spurns the balance
provided

by

the

other

two.

Those

who

fixate

upon

human

nature

typically believe that people are inherently good and naturally w i s e .
They would build institutions to fulfill people's every desire. They
allege

that

democracy.

an

omnicompetent

citizenry

can

rule

through

a

pure

(Given Lippmann's pessimistic view of human nature, he

believed the actual result of this view is to enf lame self-interested
desire and empower the will

to dominate;

totalitarianism

is

its

consequence.) Those who raise circumstance above the other elements
are a diverse group;

they include those.who hold there is no more

meaning in existence than the intensity of passing experience. They
have no standard of right, no connection to the society from which they
spring. It is the p h i l o s o p h e r 's task to put the three elements back in
their proper.relation. Lippmann believed natural law shows people how
to adjust their lives and dreams to the necessities of circumstance.
He thought natural law shows which natural desires must be restrained,
which evil can be eliminated, and that it provides the faith to live
with that darkness which cannot be destroyed.

B.

Finding Natural Law

Lippmann

began

his

career

with

realism

and

naturalism

in

ascendancy. He belittled a priori knowledge and flowery principles.
The old politics, he charged, did not succeed because it attempted "to
harness

mankind

to

abstract

principles

—

liberty,

justice

or

-35equality —
words."19

and to deduce
Such

politics

abstractions

are

illuminating

to

institutions
failed,

time-bound
say,

for

he

and

from these high-sounding
explained,

empty:

example,

because

"...it

that

the

is

those

not

very

principles

of

righteousness are eternal.... The Golden Rule in a village, and the
Golden Rule for a nation of a hundred million are two very different
things."20 Instead of following the.old truths, people should find
their

own,

individual

truth:

"No

formula

can

express

ultimate

experience.. . .each man in his inward life is a last judgment on all his
values."21
Rules of conduct, abstractions, laws nd social arrangements must
be tested continually and empirically, Lippmann urged, then modified
to suit changing circumstance. However, once such rules and forms have
served

their

"Nowadays

historical

you

still

come

function,
across

they

some

of

should

be

swept

away:

these, ancient notions,

especially in courts, where they do no little damage in perverting
justice;

but they are ghost-like and disreputable, gibbering and

largely helpless."22 Politics should not attempt to hold humans to
abstract standards conceived intuitively or otherwise derived from
the air.

Standards,

instead,

should be shaped to fit real

human

desire. Lippmann advocated a new politics that "proposes to fit creeds
and institutions to the wants of men, to satisfy their wants as fully
and

beneficially

as

possible."23

He

regarded

human

desire

as

potentially beneficial.
By

the

end

of

his

career,

his

opinions

were

dramatically

different. He had swung around and embraced the Golden Rule: "Thus the
Golden Rule is the moral maxim which establishes itself when men

-36recognize others as autonomous persons, when they acknowledge the
inalienable

manhood

of

other

m e n .

"24

He

saw

human

nature

as

acquisitive, self-interested and domineering; it must be restrained,
not fulfilled.

Truth, he held, could be objectively known by all

rational humans. He no longer denounced abstract principles as a
facade for the time-bound truths of previous generations; he found
instead certain of these principles to be necessary for the survival
of civility. His pragmatic epistemology (as shown in Section III) , saw
the whole as not really a whole, but as something changing in such a
manner that the future cannot be predicted. The mature Lippmann held
that certain knowledge of the whole is possible —

that there is an

unchangeable and knowable aspect of the universe.
Although these changes were drastic, there was some continuity
between

the

two

positions.

From he beginning he had argued for

standard-bearers of various types: the statesman (who could refine
the masses's desires) , the expert and scientist (who could refine the
view of the environment). Lippmann consistently recognized the need
for standards —

it was the nature of the standard that kept changing.

This is a general problem throughout his works: He is continually
searching for authority, for a point of orientation for the collective
compass of humanity. (Lippmann found liberalism only patially able to
fill this need.)
In A Preface to Morals, Lippmann grew noticeably more concerned
about the difficulties of modernity. Realism, he felt, had been overly
successful; now the balance had to be swung in the opposite direction.
Politics had been exposed as something much less than crystalline
fluid coursing through silver forms laid down by the Constitution. The
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"acids of modernity" had reduced the human universe to a place without
purpose

or

stated,

by

authoritative
forces

belief.

epochal

in

Belief
scope:

had

been

science,

destroyed,

he

protestantism,

technology, the rapid pace of social and economic change.
Lippmann argued in A Preface to Morals for a moralism that is a
codified version of the behavior which best fits reality. Moses, for
instance, knew the Ten Commandments before they were engraved in stone
—

they had been revealed in the experience of his people; they were

carried forward in tradition and customary behavior. The theme of
L i p p m a n n 's moralism was the necessity to adjust to reality. Instead of
adjusting human institutions to fit the wants of humans, he suggested
adjusting the wants of humans to.fit reality.

He advocated self-

restraint and "disinterestedness," the minimizing of self-interest.
In his distinctive and contradictory style he —

on the one hand -

- endorsed the stance of modern science, which he reduced to the
statement that the universe is indifferent to the needs of humanity.
Yet, on the other hand, he placed science among the acids of modernity;
it destroys humans' capacity to believe, it corrodes the purposes of
humanity. Moreover, science does not produce a satisfactory ethic to
replace that which it undermines. As a sort of compromise solution,
Lippmann developed a rational humanism. As laid out in A Preface to
Morals, it was one of his most eloquent and moving pieces of work.
Spinoza is an important point of reference. Jesus stands on the same
footing as Buddha,

both are mortals who teach people how to live

ethically for a reward in the here and now. The Eternal Creator and
Judge does not stand over all.
As moving

as his argument was,, substantial difficulties

lay

-38within it. Lippmann aimed to disprove the teleological interpretation
of the universe. He argued, in effect, against classical natural law
(which holds that natural beings have predetermined ends and that
these ends determine a hierarchically ordered definition of what is
right). So

insistent was

Lippmann

upon

breaking

with

hedonism,

perfectionism and other doctrines with an asserted end that he tended
to vanquish ends altogether. In accepting.science 's non-teleological
interpretation of the non-human world, he embraced a non-teleological
view of humanity. But he could not sustain that position. He found it
impossible

(and undesirable)

within

terms

the

of

science

to adequately account for human ends
—

in physico-chemical

impulses

or

conditioned reflexes, for instance. Even within A Preface to Morals,
the teleological perspective reappeared in places:

...if civilization is to be coherent and
confident it must be known in that
civilization what its ideals are. There
must exist in the form of clearly available
ideas
an
understanding
of what
the
fulfillment
of
the
promise
of
that .
civilization might mean, an imaginative
conception of the good at which it might,
and, if it is to flourish, at which it must
aim.25
With the passage of time, Lippmann moved to find purposive order and
essential regulative principles within human existence. In The Good
Society Lippmann's standards were no longer presented as a matter of
individual choice. They took the form of natural law. Their exact
derivation may have been unclear, but their function was apparent.
Lippmann's natural law held together a changeable, plural society.
He argued for a modern natural law, one that had been summoned up
by the pioneer liberals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to

-39dissolve the vestiges of feudalism and "make possible the emergence of
the new social

o r d e r .

"26 The merchants and manufacturers who gained

control of he new state made the law the guarantor of property and
contracts, "and they called the guarantee a natural right. Thus, as
Roscoe Pound has said, the legal rights of the eighteenth-century
Englishmen came down to us as the rights of man. "27 In A Preface to
Morals Lippmann stated that by the rights of man the industrialists
"meant primarily freedom of contract, freedom of trade, freedom of
occupation —

those freedoms, that is to say, which made it possible

for the new employer to buy and sell, to hire and fire without being
accountable to

a n y o n e .

"28

Having found that natural law in practice meant the traditionl
law with

all

its

injustices,

Beintham

and

the

radicals

of

the

nineteenth century, continued Lippmann, reacted against the entire
tradition. Their attack "brought down the humanist ideal in the crash
of the supernatural order; and from it man, who had fancied himself a
little less than the angels, emerged as much less than a
were

reduced

conditioned

to

"a mere

reflexes

physico-chemical

."30

with

man

m a n .

"29 Humans

system or a bundle of

degraded

to

"a

bundle

of

conditioned reflexes...al1 the landmarks of judgment were gone and
there remained only an aimless and turbulent moral

relativity."

"Having conceived man as a being without autonomy, they could not
believe he had authentic purposes,
obligations...."31

The

doctrine

inalienable rights or binding

opposed

to natural

rights

led,

Lippmann argued, to totalitarianism.
To restore the standard of human inviolability, Lippmann argued,
it is necessary to reestablish natural law —

a natural law, it should

-40be noted, that involves a teleological view of humanity.
As Lippmann was well aware, the forces which he brought together
do not rest easily with one another. He held at one spot that human
rights were brought into being by the modern economy, and —
in Section I —

as shown

he also held that the irresistible progress of the mode

of production disrupts "state, law, property, family, church, human
conscience,

conceptions

expectation,

of

n e e d . . . .

of

right

"32

as

a

and

wrong,

result

of

there

status,

is

"rebellion against the world or renunciation of the

of

continuing

w o r l d .

"33

He first said that ethics, laws and institutions must be adjusted
to the mode of prouction. Then, in The Public Philosophy, he contended
natural law is normative. The economy, he advisedd, should be adjusted
to his doctrine of natural .law. Lippmann was not dissatisfied with
this contradiction; he held that it cannot be resolved, that it should
not be resolved. In Lippmann's view "man must work out his destiny in
the balance, which is never fixed finally between the

t w o .

"34 This

view, he stated, has always been challenged. There are .those who would
set their standards entirely by the material realm, "the hedonists who
would withdraw wholly into the realm of existence, to eat, to drink,
and be merry without the pains and the qualms that go with immortal
yearnings." There are also those perfectionists who believe "that by
their own revolutionary acts men can make themselves the creators of
heaven on this

e a r t h .

"35 This is the error of the "modern democratic

gospel," which promises, "not the good life of this world, but the
perfect life of
failure

to

h e a v e n .

recognize

"36 The-root of all these confusions is the

that

the

two

realms

"are

inseparable

but

disparate.. . ."37 0n the one hand, "the two realms cannot be fused; " on

-41the other,
related

by

"they cannot be separated and isolated." They must "be
striking,

maintaining,

redressing

a balance

between

them."38

C.

Using Natural Law

The function of values in Lippmann's conception of natural law is
relatively clear. As will be shown, they (a) serve as a standard of
appeal in ultimate social and political decision-making, (b) control
radical

unbelief

and

deal

with

autonomy and civil order, and

the

tension

between

individual

(c) check the force of an unbridled

democracy.

(a) a standard of appeal

Lippmann invoked higher law "against the material powers" of
actual rulers as an "immaterial power" which they "can be compelled to
r e s p e c t .

... "39 -phe laws and institutions to which Lippmann's natural

law leads have.as their goal "the victory of persuasion over force."4®
When people adopt natural law, they agree to "the same criteria and
rules of reason for arriving at the truth and for distinguishing good
and evil...." When people agree upon how these matters are settled,
all issues can be decided within free political institutions.41
The specification of natural law is the effort "by which men have
sought

to

exorcise

the

devil

of

arbitrariness

in

human

-42relations. ..."42

The

means

which

they

have

employed

"Constitutional restraints and bills of rights, the whole apparatus
of

responsible

government

and

of an

independent

judiciary,

the

conception of due process of law in courts, in legislature, among
executives" —

all "depend upon moral commitments which could never

possibly be expressly stated in the laws themselves...."4^ Lippmann
situated these commitments within his doctrine of natural law; they
include

a
level
of
truthfulness
in
giving
testimony, of reasonableness in argument,
of trust, confidence, and good faith in
transactions...a mood of disinterested
ness and justice, far above anything that
the letter of the law demands.44
Only by adherence to these unwritten higher laws can people "make
actual law effective or have criteria by which to reform it."4^
Lippmann held the specific laws and institutions which abide by
his doctrine of natural law could be arrived at through a process based
on consensus. Practicality or workability is a crucial criteria to
guide the discussion of which specific laws or institutions deserve
support. These pragmatic criteria, however, are not enough. Unless
higher

law is also satisfied,

specific

laws will

not work.

For

example, when the laws of private property were interpreted "as an
absolute right," confrontation was inevitable between "those who
owned the earth" and "those who had nothing to lose."4^ An absolute
right to property, consecrated in law, meant there was "no connecting
bond,

no consensus within the same realm of rational discourse"

between property holders and the propertyless.4^ The truly enduring
basis for property laws is the recognition that "ownership is a grant

-43made by the laws to achieve n o t ...private purposes but the common
social purpose. "49 The rational, natural justification of property is
found in the belief that the earth "is the general property of all
m a n k i n d . "50

property

Under changing circumstances,

"must be kept

s o c i e t y . "51

the system of private

in accord with the

grand

ends

of

civil

Similar principles stand behind other laws, although

Lippmann did not exhaustively derive them.

(b) control radical unbelief, reconcile autonomy and order

Lippmann*s doctrine of natural law provided a foundation for
belief and a limit to radical unbelief.
When people lose "the traditional theory of the purpose of life,"
they are likely to hold that "all facts are equally good and equally
bad," that moral values are "ultimately a delusion.... "52 Experience
comes to have "no meaning beyond that which each man can find in the
intense realization of each passing moment." Experience possesses "no
underlying significance, man himself has no station in the universe,
and

the

universe

circumstances,

has

no

illuminated

plan
here

which

is

more

and

there

by

than

a

flashes

drift
of

of

self-

consciousness ."53
Lippmann posed a critical question to those who hold such a
radical belief: Do they "believe that a man is able 'to experience a
reality absolutely independent of himself'"?54 Lippmann singled out
Jean Paul Sartre from among those who answer "no" to this question. The
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radical unbelief...is in Sartre's saying
that, 'if I have done away with God the
Father,
someone is needed to invent
values.. .life has no meaning a priori... it
is up to you to give it a meaning, and value
is nothing but the meaning that you
choose.'
With this, Sartre has done away not
only with God the Father but with the
recognition that beyond our private worlds
there is a public world to which we
belong.55
Lippmann condemned Sartre and those other modern philosophers who
have ceased to believe that behind natural law "there is any kind of
independent reality that can be known and must be recognized."56
condemned them because they deny that there is a "transcendent" law,
one

that

is

not

"someone's

prejudice,

someone's

wish

or

rationalizatin, a psychological experience and no more."57 Lippmann
believed that such a law exists "objectively, not subjectively. It can
be discovered. It has to be obeyed."58
Thus, the conditions "which must be met if there is to be a good
society are there, outside our wishes, where they can be discovered by
rational inquiry, and developed and adapted and refined by rational
discussion."

"If what

is good,

what

is true,

is

only what

the

individual 'chooses' to 'invent,' then we are outside the traditions
of civility. We are back in the war of all men against all men...."59
Lippmann held that society may wish to accommodate those who
reject natural

law, those who place themselves at odds with its

principals. If such dissenters abide by the "sovereign principle" of
his doctrine —

that we live in a rational order in which by sincere

inquiry and rational debate we can distinguish the true and false, the
right and wrong —

then "they may continue to seek the t r u t h . "50

-45However,

if

they

would

"exploit

the

ignorance"

or

"incite

the

passions" of the people, or if they reject the procedure by which
official policy is determined, then they have rejected the sovereign
principle of natural law, and have exceeded the limit to dissent.
Therefore, they no longer have the right to speak freely.61

(c) check unbridled democracy

Lippmann found democracy and his doctrine of natural law to be
locked in an antagonistic relationship with one another. That is to
say, what Lippmann calld "pure" democracy —
majority rule —

political equality and

is the enemy of his natural law.

Democracy empowers a new monarch, claimed Lippmann, whose person
is the masses. Pure democracy "emasculates the sovereignty of the
people;

for

if the supreme

representatives

of

a

lawmaking power is entrusted to the

transient

majority,

they

can

at

any

time

disenfranchise not only the minority but the majority as well...."62
Pure democracy is "really brute, inchoate democracy, and the certain
foundation of absolutism."63
Lippmann regarded he furtherance of democracy as a direct attack
on his

principles

of

natural

law.

Conversely,

he

believed

his

principles of natural law are capable of containing the democratic
thrust.

I am a liberal democrat and have no wish to
disenfranchise my fellow citizens. My hope
is that both liberty and democracy can be
preserved before the one destroys the

-46other . Whether this can be done is the
question of our t i m e . 64
He claimed that, in historical terms, the principles of natural law
precede democracy:

The Bill of Rights (1689) is more than two
centuries older than universal suffrage in
Great Britain. The enfranchised people did
not establish the rule that all powers are
under the law, that laws must be made,
amended and administered by due process,
that a legitimate government must have the
consent of the governed.
I dwell upon this point because it '
throws light upon the fact...that the
enfranchised masses have not, surprisingly
enough, been those who have most staunchly
defended the institutions of freedom.65
Lippmann conceived natural law as a restraint and governor on the
appetites and passions which the democratic doctrine encourages and
e m p o w e r s . 66 His natural law led people not to democracy but to
nomocracy, a society of law, with an officialdom of judges and
judgelike legislators and executives. He argued that the temper of all
officialdom "must be predominantly judicial: that holds not only for
the judges themselves but for the legislators and executives as well,
indeed for all who wish to serve the public i n t e r e s t . " 6 7 This is
because a judge understands "that he is not there to impose his will
but to judge among visible claimants and invisible i n t e r e s t s . . . . " 68
When the legislator ceases to think of
himself as an impartial
judge among
contending interests, he soon adopts an
imperial view of his function. He ceases to
judge causes among the people: he issues
commands to the people, and regards himself
no longer as the representative of their
true will but as the providential contriver
of their destiny. Against this imperial
view of the state...the liberal movement
has always fought.68
Here Lippmann again faced his unresolved tension between the
right and the good. It was unresolved because he never decided whether
the right is the maximization of the good

(as is the case in^a

teleological view) or whether the right is determined independently

-47and has priority over, the pursuit of the good (as is the case in a nonteleological or deontological view). At this point in Lippmann's
argument he swung strongly away from a teleological view. He denied
that the "purposes, plans, and management of a social order in the
future" are knowable.^O
Lippmann was stalked by fear of a mass telocracy, the popular
democracy whose members hold a common telos. He assumed the worst of
such an arrangement, seeing it as pure, unbridled will, a behemoth
motivated by the crudest desire —

an absolutism as rank as fascism. To

him, it was not a remote danger, a tangent possibility, but a present
tendency, an almost preponderant force in modernity.
Lippmann's error was to collapse democracy into telocracy. He
saw the masses as inherently concerned with the maximization of the
good, he saw them as without an understanding of the right. Lippmann's
positiion, however, is self-serving, for he himself remained unclear
in his own views about the right.

D.

Growing Negative about Humanity

When Lippmann was young and held a relatively optimistic view of
human nature/ he did not espouse a doctrine of natural law. That is
regrettable, for if he had, he perhaps would have added something
creative and hopeful to natural law thinking. Instead, it was in part
his increasingly pessimistic view of human nature which brought him to
develop his doctrine of natural law, and it was this view of human
nature which assured that his natural law would be conservative and —

-48one is forced to say

frightened of the future.

As noted in the introduction to this section, the young Lippmann
believed that institutions should be adjusted to human desire. In A
Preface to Morals he referred to this stance as the outlook of the
liberals: "If they thought that man was naturally innocent and good,
they have accepted some one of the many variants of liberalism, and
concerned themselves not with the reform of desire but with the
provision of opportunities for its

f u l f i l l m e n t

."72 The young Lippmann

insisted that liberal institutions should strive to provide such
opportunities.
However,

A Preface to Morals also recognized a deep-seated

tension within such an arrangement. When human nature "is naively
trusted, it produces so much disorder and corruption that men once
again idealize order and restraint."73 The inevitable result, he
stated, is a reaction against the liberal view and a swing of the
pendulum back to the conservative view of human nature:

If they thought their natural impulses were
by way of being lecherous, greedy, and
cruel, they have accepted some form of
classical and Christian doctrine that man
must subdue his naive impulses, and by
reason, grace, or renunciation, transform
his will.74
On the balance, the young Lippmann concluded, "No particular view [of
human nature]
However,
differently.

e n d u r e s .

the

"^5

mature

Lippmann

regarded

human

nature

much

In A Preface to Morals, which can be regarded as a

transitional book, he referred to "the naive and imperious lust of our
infantile

natures...."76

in The Good

Society

he

wrote

of

"the

-49primitive and persistent impulse to dominate,.to submit, to stand in
awe of power and to seek its protection;"77 he also defined the
"instinctive" political philosophy: "For every man, until he has been
taught differently, is predisposed to believe that what he wills
should have the force of law.1,78 In The Public Philosophy he denounced
"the disposition of our first natures, of our natural and uncivilized
selves," characterizing these beliefs as the "delusion of men that
they are gods...."79
Having moved to this negative view of human nature, Lippmann
argued

that

these

natural

desires

"must

undergo

a

transvaluation...."80 people must cease to desire that which causes
evil. The Good Society no longer defined liberalism as the view which
concerns itself with the fulfillment of human desire: " .. .the logic of
liberalism calls for...the inordinately difficult conquest of man's
lower nature by his higher nature."81

in The Public Philosophy

Lippmann's doctrine of natural law mandated "the government of our
appetites and passions by the reason of a second, civilized and
therefore, acquired nature."82 What the young Lippmann had called
liberalism was now strikingly close to what The Public Philosophy
denounced as the doctrine of "the hard totalitarian Jacobins of the
twentieth century... ."83 "Relying upon the inherent rightness of the
natural impulses of man's first nature, the Jacobin theory does away
with

the

second

civilized

nature...."84

"instead of ruling

the

elemental impulses, they stimulated and armed them."85
What is it, one must ask Lippmann, that the "elemental impulses"
desire? That they seek domination is clear; but Lippmann did not
always regard domination to be harmful; in many situations he took

-50hierarchical organization, one form of dominance, to be natural and
beneficial. So the desire to dominate is not to be eliminated but
somehow

shaped

to

fit

within

the

form

of

the

existing

social

organization. What is difficult to understand, though, is how those on
the bottom of the hierarchy are to justify eliminating their natural
desire to dominate, while those on the top are to justify their desire
as natural and beneficial.
There is yet another disturbing vagueness about the sort of
objects the elemental impulses desire. Lippmann suggested, when he
referred to heaven on earth, that people naturally desire utopia —
immortality amidst peace and super-abundance. But he also gave a much
more materialistic and down-to-earth cast to what people naturally
desire: "...there are not objects enough in the world to fulfill all
human d e s i r e s . " ^

where,

one interjects, would one draw the line

between primitive desires and civilized ones? Is a nomadic African,
for instance, whose children are dying of starvation guilty of naive
desire for wishing there would be water where none has fallen for
thirty months? Is it civilized to demand material incentives in the
form of tax deductions before one will contribute funds to a welldigging program for the African family? Is it naive to desire not
simply remuneration for one's work, but other, intangible forms of
reward, such as a sense of accomplishment?
Lippmann's open-ended treatment of the dividing line between
naive

and

continually

civilized
and

desire

publicly

could
debate

be

read

such

as

an

issues.

invitation
However,

to
his

consistently elitist bias, which emphasized knowledge accessible to
only a few, indicated the opposite.

-51Public discussion of these matters might reveal that there is not
an

inevitable

tension between

people’s natural

desires

and

the

requirements of civilized life. Young Lippmann, it would seem, was on
the right track when he argued against the separation of the natural
and the higher

instincts.

Forcing

such a division

ignites what

Santayana called "a war between nature and morality....

As one instinct after another becomes
furious or disorganized,
cowardly or
criminal, under these artificial restric
tions, the public and private conscience
turns
against
it
[nature]
all
its
forces....nature is rendered vicious and
overlaid with pruriency, artifice, and the
love of novelty.... Thus the disorder in
m a n ’s life and disposition, when grown
intolerable, leads him to condemn the very
elements out of which order might have been
constituted, and to mistake his total
confusion for his total depravity.87
Contrary to the mature Lippmann, repression and self-alienation
are not necessities. Civility can rest upon natural desire. It is
possible

to change

the environment

to eliminate many causes

of

alienation. A harmonious order may be possible, or at least an order
that believes people naturally desire goods that are not destructive
of harmony.

John Rawls, for instance, has developed a persuasive

argument for what he calls

"the Aristotelian Principle":

"other

things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized
capacities {their innate or trained abilities) , and this enjoyment
increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its
complexity."®® Exercise of the Aristotelian Principle is rewarding to
both the doer and the observer:

-52As we witness the exercise of well-trained
abilities by others, these displays are
enjoyed by us and arouse a desire that we
should be able to do the same things
ourselves. We want to be like those persons
who can exercise the abilities that we find
latent in our nature.89
Other, more general human needs and potentialities could be
specified

and

elaborated,

Political

philosopher

and

natural

Sigmund has

law

deduced

suggested social

from

them.

cooperation,

equality, freedom and "more difficult of accomplishment, community
and love...."90
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III.

A.

OBJECTIVITY

Context of Walter Lippmann*s Theory of Objectivity

The orthodox view holds that Lippmann's book Public Opinion
(1922) helped free the main current of Anglo-American political
science from the deep, still backwater of the formal-legal
paradigm.1 in a review article on the "science" of the state,
Harry Eckstein refers to Lippmann as one of the writers who
developed a "sort of counterscience" to the formal-legal
s y n th e s is .2

Eckstein maintains that, as a result of the work of

Lippmann and others, political science was rejuvenated by an
infusion of novel subjects —

mass parties, interest groups,

public opinion and so forth.
Lippmann is among those writers to whom Michael Curtis
attributes the "psychological approach to politics." Writing in
The Great Political Theories, Curtis states that the
psychological movement was stimulated "by a disenchantment by
some over the preoccupation of traditional political philosophy
with formal institutions of government and law and with
moralizing about rights, duties and freedoms."3 Similarly, Robert
Ezra Park contends that, on its publication, Lippmann's Public
Opinion was the best text to date "for the social psychological
interpretation of politics.
Lippmann had been introduced to social psychology by one of
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its founders, the lapsed Fabian socialist Graham Wallas. To
Wallas's work, Lippmann brought his own political theory plus a
smattering of Freudian psychoanalysis. The result was Public
Opinion, the book which Lippmann's biographer Ronald Steel says
"pushed beyond the sterile doctrines of traditional political
science and helped spawn whole schools of inquiry: public opinion
polls, academic courses, scholarly journals, even graduate
degrees.”5
This thesis, however, argues that Public Opinion contributed
less to building up political science and more to tearing it
down. Authors such as Lippmann could make a persuasive case
against formal-legalism, but they had difficulty erecting a new
paradigm to replace it.6 overrun by behavioralists and systems
theorists, seduced by research programs of varying ilk and
stature, political science never attained the alleged rigor of
the neoclassical synthesis of economics. Political science
remains a would-be science, a discipline in search of a
methodology.
Walter Lippmann, despite the implications of the orthodox
point of view, never took seriously the pursuit of a method —
for either himself or his discipline. From inception to
conclusion, his work was that of a theorist. The mainstream of
political science may have found in Public Opinion matters of
interest to the methodological debate, but Lippmann himself had
no methodology

(unless classical political philosophy is regarded

as a method); in fact, Lippmann did not even remain a firm
believer in a generalized scientific method.7
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No, the orthodox interpretation of Public Opinion is not
adequate. The book cannot be understood simply within the context
of Anglo-American political science. It also must be judged as a
piece of political theory. Lippmann was indeed assaulting formallegalism, and he definitely used social psychology in his attack.
However, this onslaught should not be interpreted as a fresh
point of departure; instead it should be seen as the continuation
of a long-standing battle. This is true both in terms of
Lippmann's life and the much longer life of political theory.
First, in regard to Lippmann, he used the psychological approach
to argue for a position which he had staked out long before he
took up the cause of social psychology —

a position which he

held long after he lost interest in the psychological approach.
Second, in regard to political theory, Political Opinion fits
snugly within that portion of the liberal tradition concerned
with the threat of the subjective, that nemesis which Locke
described as "the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will
of another m a n . . . . "8 From its seminal works onward, liberalism
did not champion liberation from all authority; it stood against
arbitrary, irrational authority.9 Those who refined the work of
Locke, particularly Adam Smith and David Hume, recognized "the
limits of reason and the pervasiveness of irrational forces in
man and society."10 Liberalism did not stand for the unlimited
freedom of private judgment;

instead, it attempted to delineate

the subjective's proper sphere of influence. What began as an
attack on capricious and arbitrary rule, as personified by the
monarch, thus ended as an attack on any subjectivism that might
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stray into politics. Boundaries would have to be set. Liberal
constitutionalism, in the words of phenomenologist Henry Kariel,

was designed to exclude from decision
making arenas...the action of people who
are impulsive, shiftless, and injudicious,
who are not given to making calculations,
who fail to see the present in the light of
both a validated past and an extrapolated
future. " H
This, then, is the theoretical context within which Public

Opinion is situated. Lippmann argued that it is impossible for
people to know the world as it truly is, because the process of
knowing inevitably interferes. Based on this, he argued for a
self-consciously "neutral" expertise, one which will "consciously
provide a way of overcoming the subjectivism of human
o p i n i o n .

..."12 This fits snugly within the liberal tradition,

which typically aims to limit the subjective with "objective"
restraints. Section I examined Lippmann's use of the "objective"
restraint of the economy, Section II the moral restraint of
natural law, and this section examines the restraint of governing
elites. Before turning to Lippmann's attack on the irrationality
and subjectivity of democracy, it is necessary to review the
epistemology of Public Opinion.

B.

Public Opinion and Knowledge

Although Walter Lippmann was influenced by his Harvard
professor William James, it is misleading to consider him a
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student of James —

if by that one means a person devoted to the

systematic elaboration, clarification or even criticism of a
teacher. Lippmann frequently quoted James

(particularly in his

earlier work) and on several occasions formally acknowledged his
debt to his mentor, but Lippmann's work does not consistently
uphold the basics of James's pragmatic epistemology.
James held, in simplest terms, that the totality exists but
the human intellect cannot grasp it. Lippmann raised no doubts
about the first contention, regarding the ontological objectivity
of nature. On the second contention, the limits of human
rationality, Lippmann held two opposing viewpoints: As was
established in Section II, the older Lippmann of

The Public

Philosophy believed that an "independent reality" exists,
"objectively, not subjectively. It can be discovered. It has to
be obeyed."13 The younger Lippmann, however, held the opposite
point of view. Lippmann's general argument in Public Opinion was
that humanity's problem in knowing the world is not a practical
one, but one of principle: The knowing process always,
necessarily determines that one knows a thing in a way that
precludes knowing the thing as it is. As Lippmann's mentor James
put it, all abstract ideas, scientific theories and
interpretations of experience are simply manmade languages. They
are ideas, to capsulize James's view, created by the intellect to
lead us from an older form of experience to a newer one. It is
the nature of the intellect to act as a unifying force. It grasps
phenomena as they come into our lives and gives them coherent
form. This coherence, however, should not be mistaken for
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anything more than a tiny, fleeting patch of manmade unity on an
immense and tossing sea of r e a l i t y . -*-4
Lippmann's epistemology in Public Opinion ran a similar
course: Man lives in a world "too big, too complex, and too
fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal
with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and
combinations." So humans reconstruct the world as "a simpler
model."15 Man creates a counterfeit reality, one based upon "the
casual fact, the creative imagination, the wiill to believe...."15
Lippmann denounced the claim that human thought and perception
naturally take the form of "facts" as a prejudice foisted upon
the world by empiricists. There is no such thing as a pure fact,
arising neatly in the mind; there is no such event as a direct
and truthful connection between reality and human response.
Lippmann, therefore, went beyond a "realist" theory of
knowledge. He did not hold that the sensations copy or
objectively reflect reality. Reality does not determine thought
in a direct, hard-and-fast manner. Instead, according to
Lippmann, people create screening mechanisms,

"pseudo

environments" that run interference between them and the world.
These pseudo-environments or "interior representations of the
world, are a determining element in thought, feeling, and
action."17 These "pictures inside people's heads do not
automatically correspond with the world outside."1® When people
act on the basis of these pictures, the result eventuates "in the
real environment...."1® Sooner or later contradiction develops
between the action based on the pseudo-environment and its effect
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in the real environment.

Then comes the sensation of butting one's
head against a stone wall, of learning by
experience,
and
witnessing
Herbert
Spencer's tragedy of the murder of a
Beautiful Theory by a Gang of Brutal Facts,
the
discomfort
in
short
of
a
maladjustment.20
In response, Lippmann argued, man adjusts to eliminate the
maladjustment. This adjustment takes place through the medium of
fictions.21 "By fictions I do not mean lies.... The range of
fictions extends all the way from complete hallucination to the
scientists' perfectly self-conscious use of a schematic
model...."22
This is a crucial and distinctive element of the young
Lippmann1s epistemology. He claimed that people have to
fictionalize about the environment because it is impossible to
know it. People adjust their pseudo-environment in response to
the real environment. The motion proceeds from maladjustment to
adjustment, through the medium of fiction. This device is similar
to the "problematic situation" of pragmatist John Dewey. One
knows something when it "fits" or "works" with one's conception
of oneself and the world.
Lippmann, therefore, set up an irreconcilable conflict
between the subjective and the objective. He framed it, however,
in a manner that slights the subjective and overplays the
objective. Because he emphasized the necessity of continually
adjusting the subjective pseudo-environment, Lippmann underplayed
the fact that the environment, too, is ever-changing.
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"Existence," in the words of Santayana, "cannot be
a r r e s t e d . ..."23

Moreover, Lippmann created a dialectic in which

the subjective must always give way to the objective. There is no
ideal, in the young Lippmann's view; there was nothing belonging
to the inner world that was as significant, perpetual and as
constant as the outer world. Lippmann erred grievously here, for
it is not the real that endures. As Santayana wrote,

"only the

transmissible forms of things can endure, to match the
transmissible faculties which living beings hand down to one
another." It is the ideal which is "essentially eternal and
capable of endless embodiments...."24
Lippmann emphasized an unchanged reality, a changed picture
inside people's heads. In this view, even though there is a
nearly endless arrangement of pictures possible inside the head,
there is no freedom from reality. The innate nature of man is
reduced to a transmission belt.
This line of criticism can be pursued right into the
ontological structure of the young Lippmann's world. A pseudo)

environment, he wrote, is "a hybrid compounded of 'human nature'
and conditions."25 This definition must be plumbed for all it
contains, because —

at this point in his career —

Lippmann

almost uniformly defined human nature as an inseparable blend of
nature and nurture, inheritance and circumstance. He claimed
nothing further about people's needs and potentialities.26 By
implication, however, his definition of the pseudo-environment
constitutes a definite claim about the content of human nature.
To develop this claim, one should first summarize the manner in
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which the pseudo-environment arises: Humans
through their senses,

(a) view the world

(b) create mental images of the world,

act, in response to those images, and

(c)

(d) adjust the images in

response to their impression of the consequences of their
actions. The key to this process could be called the "cognitive
consciousness," a term opined by Ron Perrin. The cognitive
consciousness adjusts and readjusts the pseudo-environment in
response to conditions or images based on conditions. Lippmann
described this faculty as an "innate disposition" whose "central
p art...retains its specific character and remains common to all
individuals and situations in which the instinct is excited."27
The cognitive consciousness, thus, was described by Lippmann as
an innate, unchanging and universal aspect of humanity. This
amounted to a potentially egalitarian statement on Lippmann1s
part: Everyone possesses a cognitive consciousness. Lippmann did
not specify, however, whether all cognitive consciousnesses are
created equal. As is shown later in this section, he obviously
did not believe all people are equal in this capacity, for —
without explanation —

he suggested that some individuals were

better able to reduce the discrepancies between the pseudo
environment and the environment. Because of this difference in
capacities, Lippmann recommended that "a machinery of knowledge"
be built so that those already capable of forming reliable
pictures of the environment would have special access to
decision-makers.28
Beyond the existence of the cognitive consciousness,
Lippmann made no further claims about the natural capacities,
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-needs or ends of human beings. One cannot say anything, he
argued,

"about what man is and always will be...or about what are

the necessary conditions of society."2® Man may possess
instinctual responses, such as fear, "but what he will fear and
how he will try to escape, is determined not from birth but by
e x p e r i e n c e . T o discuss the ends of individuals, or of society,
is to engage in useless pontification, Lippmann concluded.
The implications of this position are quietistic. Lippmann's
human, as described above, existed within an externally confined
being. Lippmann's ontology predisposed his politics against
defining and realizing the good. What began as a relativistic and
modern psychological theory was taken to conservative
conclusions. Humans react and adjust, but they don't idealize and
create a new world. Revealingly, when Lippmann reversed his
position on ideals, arguing for objectively knowable natural law,
he came to much the same quietistic conclusion: People must
adhere to those higher values which can be objectively known, to
fail to do so will bring maladjustment and chaos into the world.

C.

The Irrationality of Democracy

In Lippmann's view, the threat of the subjective existed not
in the authority of the executive but in the growing power of the
masses. The march of democracy had, in his eyes, substituted the
subjectivism of the multitude for that of the monarch.
Lippmann and others were alarmed, in the words of
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Lazarsfeld, because "people who did not belong to the ruling
classes from which the government personnel was recruited" were
demanding "a voice in public a f f a i r s . "31 Lippmann's response to
this democratic pressure was unequivocally negative. He declared
it a "false ideal" which held that the voters are "inherently
competent" to direct public

a f f a i r s .

32 using the psychological

argument outlined earlier in this section, he concluded that the
traditional democratic theory of public opinion is flawed because
it is based on "the intolerable and unworkable fiction that each
of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public
a ffa irs .

"33 only the mythical citizen of a mythical society could

conform to the traditional theory, Lippmann argued; in reality,
citizens possess not an insatiable appetite for self-government,
but myriad desires, some trivial, some grand, some self-centered,
some social.
The practical effect of the democratic theory of public
opinion had been, Lippmann argued, to expand the influence of the
irrational. Democracy created a power in the state, he
maintained, that could impose the irrational upon society. In an
earlier book, he used the example of William Jennings Bryan's
campaign for the Presidency. Bryan, he argued, attempted to use
mass democracy to preserve a defunct form of economic
organization.34 The agrarian populists of the nineteenth century,
whose preeminent spokesman was Bryan, fought against historical
necesity, according to Lippmann. The modern, industrialized
economy would inevitably destroy their pastoral order, Lippmann
predicted. The populists acted irrationally and arbitrarily when
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they tried to stop the restructuring of their way of life, he
argued.

It was irrational of the farmers to believe their desire

to preserve their way of life had more weight with history than
the inexorable shift of labor to the industrial and urban
centers. Lippmann did not argue that the modern economy is
inherently reasonable or necessarily just. In fact, he went out
of his way to dramatize the trauma and destruction and injustice
that have accompanied the evolution of capitalism. However, as
was shown in Section I, he regarded the division of labor and the
extension of markets as historical necessities. To try to stop
them or to alter their inexorable progress amounts to bashing
one's head against the wall —

and that is irrational.

As Lippmann grew older, he stuck by only the conclusion of
his argument in Public Opinion: He continued to insist that the
democratic method was unworkable, but he no longer argued from a
relativistic point of view. In The Public Philosophy, as was made
clear in Section II, he based his political argument upon the
objective existence of natural law. His description of the
shortcomings of the masses, however, had not changed at all. He
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maintained:

(1) The masses "cannot be counted upon to apprehend

regularly and promptly the reality of

t h i n g s .

"35 (2) For the

masses to understand it, an issue cannot be told in its true
complexity and necessary detail; instead it must be simplified
and thus grievously distorted.

(3) When the masses give their

opinions as voters, the most they can say is "yes" or "no."
Whether Lippmann viewed democracy'from his youthful,
relativistic perspective, or from his mature, absolutist
perspective, he saw the same problem; The democratic method
distorts and crudely oversimplifies the information available to
decisionmakers? because of this, the democratic method is capable
of only elementary and childish opinions. "Where mass opinion
dominates the government there is a morbid derangement of the
true functions of power. The derangement brings about the
enfeeblement, verging on paralysis, of the capacity to

g o v e r n .

"36

In Public Opinion Lippmann proposed to solve this dilemma
through the creation of "an independent, expert organization for
making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make
the

d e c i s i o n s

."37 in The Public Philosophy Lippmann called for a

radically stronger executive: "A mass cannot govern...."38 it is

. -66the executive which is "the active power in the s t a t e . "39 In
both situations he suggested the transfer of authority to an
elite. The common characteristic of the elite of Public Opinion
and the elite of The Public Philosophy was an ability to perceive
the necessities of circumstance and a willingness to adjust to
them. The elite exercised the same relationship to the masses and
their desires as it exercised to its own desires:pThe elite was
to deny its immediate desires, to seek beyond the immediately
seen, to base its decisions upon a larger sense of reality. This
capacity, the distinguishing characteristic of Lippmann's elite,
was possessed by very few. On why these few possess this
characteristic, Lippmann was silentTj The only reasonable
explanation :
—
—

particularly within the context of Public Opinion

is that s.ome variable (s) in the environment enabled the elite

to better grasp the nature of reality. Lippmann treated this
cognitive enrichment of the few (and impoverishment of the many)
as a circumstance of nature, similar to the widening of the
market and the increasing division of labor. He did not pursue
the extent to which the general public's understanding could be
improved by altering some aspect of the environment. Instead, he
went the other direction. Lippmann institutionalized the existing
hierarchical distribution of cognitive ability, of knowledge and
of power. He took elitist institutions to be natural, and he
built theories which —

if followed —

would make elitism

inevitable.
Thus, when examined from the perspective of a popular
democrat, Lippmann is vulnerable to a devastating attack.
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the United States away from the substantive fulfillment of
political equality. The task of Lippmann's elite was not tutelage
of the masses in self-realization;

its goal was not to elevate

more people to its level of philosophical self-awareness. Its
message was self-denial —

the acceptance of one's position. The

task of his elite was to stem the onrush of the masses, to push
back the democratic urge which had welled up from below. Those
"insiders" with superior cognitive abilities are entitled, in
Lippmann's view, to help exercise authority in the name of the
general interest. They are qualified to be among those who
balance the interests of society from above.
What, however, of an arrangement which does not accept
hierarchy as necessary. Is it possible? It is true, as Lippmann
contended, that a complex, technological society necessarily
requires individuals with extremely specialized abilities and
knowledge. Nonetheless, individuals do not have to be riveted to
particular abilities or skills. The social fixation of an
individual according to his or her particular function is not
necessary for increased economic productivity, why should it be
necessary for political efficacy? The division of tasks can be
handled in other ways, such as taking turns. Decision-making
authority can be distributed in other ways, by lottery or
rotation.40
• Lippmann asserts that specialization necessarily requires
hierarchical authority. That, however, is Lippmann's preference.
*

?

Those who have certain specialties do not necessarily require or
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where delegation of authority is necessary,

In those situations
and there admittedly

are some, then. L i p p m a n n 's suggestion that those who exercise
authority should be advised by experts has certain merits, as
does his later suggestion that those who exercise authority
should adhere to s o c i e t y ’s highest values. By this point,
however, one must seriously question L i p p m a n n 's justification for
these experts and moral stalwarts. His only consistent argument
on their behalf is that they check the authoriy of the masses.

D.

The Mechanism of Control

How Lippmann's elite was to prove the truth of its knowledge
and thus earn its special status was a simple procedure —

in

theory. Since the elite's knowledge better fit its time and
circumstance than the knowledge of the masses,

the elite's

decisions "work" better in the given environment.
Lippmann, however, was not disingenuous about how
problematic this theory was in practice. He acknowledged,
instance,

that consent to the elite or to any authority can be

manufactured and based on deception,
on truth.

for

as well- as earned and based

Psychological research and modern media, Lippmann

observed, have caused a "revolution" in the practice of
democracy: They have made it possible for experts to create or
manipulate public opinion. This change Lippmann called
"infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic
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power."41 Revealingly, he did not denounce the manufacture of
opinion as a dangerous development. "Within the life of the
generation now [1922] in control of affairs, persuasion has
become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular
government."42i He regarded this as only one more factor in the
equation of modern 'politics, one more reason why it was no longer
possible "to believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the
knowledge for the management of human affairs comes up
spontaneously from the human heart."43 Lippmann did not openly
encourage the manipulation of public opinion; in fact, he implied
that the manufacture of opinion was one of the causes of the
decline of democracy. However, neither did he condemn it as a
tool.
' This leaves unanswered, however, the question of the
content of public opinion:

Is public opinion merely the aggregate

of a multitude of pseudo-environments? How does the public come
to agree upon a working definition of reality? Lippmann1s answer
to this question involved a mechanism he called the "stereotype."
Although Steel passed lightly over the subject, it is an
explosive concept, probably the most controversial idea in Public
Opinion. In startlingly realistic language, Lippmann defined a
stereotype as the dominant ideology —

although he never resorted

to the term "ideology."
Stereotypes, he said, are the "most pervasive of all
influences" on the way one sees the world.44 They are the
preconceptions that, "unless education has made us acutely aware,
govern deeply the whole process of perception."4^ Some people's
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they are only stere.otypes" and "hold them lightly" and "modify
them gladly."46 Stereotypes "may not be a complete picture of the
world," but they are a "more or less consistent picture...to
which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and
our hopes have adjusted themselves." "A pattern of stereotypes is
not neutral."47 The "perfect stereotype" is Aristotle's argument
that there are humans who are slaves by nature. Aristotle's
argument is logically "worthless."4^ it is simply the slave
holder's stereotype imposed upon reality.

Each slave holder was to look upon his
chattels as natural slaves. When his eye
had been trained to see them that way, he
was to note as confirmation of their
servile character the fact that they
performed servile work, that they were
competent to do servile work, and that they
had the muscles to do servile work.4^
Aristotle could not see through this stereotype because it
"imposes a certain character on the data" of his senses, before
the data reaches his intelligence.50 other examples of
stereotypes include "the American version of progress" which
transformed "an unusual amount of pugnacity, acquisitiveness, and
lust of power into productive work." This civilization-building
ethic "has been a success so nearly perfect in the sequence of
ideals, practice, and results, that any challenge to it is called
u n - A m e r i c a n .51

BUt the American stereotype of progress was "a

very partial and inadequate way of representing the world.

With the stereotype of 'progress' before
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little that did not accord with that
progress. They saw the expansion of cities ,
but not the accretion of slums; they
cheered the census statistics, but refused
to consider overcrowding; they pointed
with pride to their growth, but would not
see the drift from the land, or the
unassimilated immigration. They expanded
industry furiously at reckless cost to
their natural resources; they built up
gigantic corporations without arranging
for industrial relations.52
Stereotypes, for all their blind spots, are a necessity, for —
among other reasons —

they are "a defense of our position in

society," and they tend "to preserve us from all the bewildering
effect of trying to see the world steadily and see it whole."53
Stereotypes can be modified when experience contradicts them.
However, if a person "is no longer plastic, or if some powerful
interest makes it highly inconvenient to rearrange his
stereotypes," the contradiction will be forgotten or otherwise
put aside

(or perhaps the person will become cynical).54

Lippmann's concept of a stereotype is so incisive that it
provides a tool to critique his work, as well as the work of
others. Lippmann stated that stereotypes are not logical and that
reasonable people can see through them and modify them.

(One can

also assume that there would be times when it would not be in the
interest of reasonable people to modify the existing
stereotypes.)

Although Lippmann implied that the reasonable elite

can see things as they are, that would be inconsistent with his
general epistemology (putting aside its internal contradictions).
So when seeing things reasonably, the elite is actually only
seeing things differently —

that is, according to a different
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set of stereotypes.

Interpreted in this light, the elite's

"rationality" evaporates. Lippmann attacked democracy because it
elevates the subjectivism of the masses, but then he embraced an
oligarchical arrangement which elevates the subjectivism of the
elite.55
Those who Lippmann described as holding stereotypes lightly
and as being capable of modifying stereotypes could be considered
the official

(and unofficial)

ideologists. Lippmann implied that

these individuals don't necessarily believe the truth of the new
stereotypes they create; it is easy to imagine them as paid
purveyors of propaganda.
The transmission mechanism between those who modify
stereotypes and the mass of people was not specified by Lippmann.
The implication in places, specifically the reference to the all
pervasiveness of stereotypes, was that people either voluntarily
or unknowingly consent to stereotypes. The art of persuasion
obviously played a role here. The reference to a "powerful
interest" that "makes it highly inconvenient" for people to
change their stereotypes presents the totalitarian possibility.
This powerful interest could easily be seen as one which attempts
to control the dissemination of stereotypes, approving some,
rejecting others. Lippmann connected stereotypes, through
examples, to economic progress and military power. The
implication was, again, that the prevailing stereotypes are those
that reinforce not simply the position of every member of society
but first and foremost the position of the most powerful members.
"The management of affairs," Lippmann wrote during the
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"tends once again to rest in a governing class, a class

which is not hereditary, which is without titles, but is none the
less obeyed and

f o l l o w e d .

"56 Lippmann's theory of public opinion

explained why he thought this was necessary. His theory of
stereotypes and his acceptance of the manufacture of consent show
how he thought it could be done.
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CONCLUSION

Life may be full, blessed with love and brilliance and
strength, but death is a simple, unceremonial thing. A birth is
glorious, an awakening, a cementing of bonds between male and
female, between parent and child; a birth gives meaning to the
present and reaffirms the existence of the future. The dead give
us the past —

tangible in the corpse and its possessions,

ethereal in the substance of our memories

(sometimes more elusive

than we desire, sometimes more pronounced and vigorous than the
moment from which they spring, sometimes more satisfying and
sensual than the present). All this seems simple enough, well
worn by the words of tens of thousands of writers. What is more
difficult, less worn perhaps, is the relation between the dead
and the future.
When Walter Lippmann was about to die, he asked Louis
Auchincloss, who had come to his bedside, if his last will and
testament was in order. "Nothing more" was on Lippmann's mind,
according to Ronald Steel.

"No complaints, no fears, no regrets.

Never did he speak of prayer, or of God, or of an afterlife."!
There was courage and realism and consistency in Lippmann's
request of Auchincloss. Lippmann was concerned with his bequest
to the living, not with ruminations about the soul or
immortality. Lippmann's last will and testament was, obviously, a
statement about the relations between the dead and the future.
The possessions of the dead can comfort, divide, placate, wound
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con
sequences of his death in a very American way. He set in order
the property which, according to law, was his to have and
control.
What, however, of that part of him which was never his to
own or control? What of the political testament of Walter
Lippmann? What of the enduring substance of his work? As a
political philosopher, Lippmann worked with the common property
of humanity —

its language and ideals. As an humanist, he spent

his life immersed in the universal aspects of humanity —

its

emotions and needs, both animal and sublime. All these are —
even more than private property —

things granted to individuals

not for private purposes but for the common social purpose. They
are inherited through books and upbringing and a social form of
intuition. They are passed on through private lives, through
public actions and utterances.
The political testament of Walter Lippmann, then, is a
product of the American tradition of political philosophy. The
major problems in the political philosophy of Walter Lippmann are
not the unique difficulties of an individual thinker; they are a
reflection of deep-seated tensions within the American tradition.,This thesis identified three major tensions within this
tradition. First, standards are not set solely by either the
material or ideal realm. Instead, the two realms are continually
related and an always changing equilibrium struck between them.
Second, modernity

(which could be summarized as liberalism,

capitalism and the scientific outlook)

is a double-edged sword.
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alienates. Modernity makes a nation wealthy and powerful, but
corrupts its citizenry with expediency, opportunism and drift.
The modern citizen customarily adopts a non-teleological view of
the universe but clings to a muted teleological view of human
existence. Third, There is no settled view of human nature, of
the needs and desires of humanity. Human nature is at one point
regarded as innately opposed to civil order, while at another it
is the very foundation of the highest forms of civility. The
acquisitive, self-interested and domineering individual is lauded
in one setting but condemned in another.
These, in short, are the problems identified by Walter
Lippmann. This is the enduring testament he left to the future
when he died in 1974. As this thesis made clear, he left these
issues far from resolved. For that reason, Lippmann remains
important to theorists today. He guides political thinkers to
fundamental tensions in American political philosophy. From
there, however, work must begin anew, for beyond that point,
Lippmann's guidance begins to fail.
As has been shown, Lippmann approached these issues with a
foregone preference for the existing order. The mature Lippmann
consistently resisted change that was not founded upon current
circumstances and their direct needs. He was, by and large, what
this thesis has described as a conservative determinist, a
theorist who desired the present to be securely bound to the
past. Standing against idealists and radicals, he assigned
primacy to the past, rather than the future. He preferred

-77-

hierarchy and stability to equality and change. Although he
invoked the ideal in his defense of order, his guiding light was
always close to the ground, a part of the status quo.
Lippmann denied the future and clung too closely to the
present. On what the future held, he would not speculate, nor did
he dwell on its role in the present:

"Never did he speak of

prayer, or of God, or of an afterlife." Lippmann may have claimed
to see an open future, but he inevitably filled it with the
present.
Lippmann's search, in the end, was not for the future, nor
was it for meaning or for purpose. Lippmann was looking for
authority. The unresolved tensions of American political
philosophy were, for him, not simply questions in need of answers
but the burning call for an authority that could resolve any
disruption caused by those tensions. Lippmann was concerned with
how the fundamental questions were answered, of course, but the
contradictions in his responses demonstrate that the substance of
the answers was largely secondary to him. Paramount to Lippmann
was the preservation of authority. Not any authority, but
authority vested in the hands of those who are pledged to be
gentle with the status quo.
To carry forward Lippmann's work is a worthy endeavor. To do
so, one should begin with his questions, not his answers, for his
answers cling too closely to the past, whereas his questions
harken to the future.
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on class struggle and felt that inciting the masses to

-82mob action was not a desirable way to bring about a
better society.
Like most children of the Progressive
era, he wanted to make society more equitable, not
turn it upside down."
(Once again, the imagery o f .the
masses as ah easily led herd of children flows so readily
from Steel's pen that one senses more than a slight
affinity with Lippmann's elitism.)
23

24

PtP, 239.
PtP, 240.
That Marx's dialectic was "singleminded" is
about the last observation any serious reader would make,
The claim is contradicted by both the dialectic's internal
working and by the immense range of subject matter to
which it was applied by Marx and Engels (not to mention
the current growth industry of academics following in
their footsteps).
One further note about this quotation:
Lippmann's
concern for the average person was unusual, not simply
because it was rare for him to voice such a thought (the
average person is more frequently subsumed within the
masses, a threat to stability),but also because it perhaps
reveals a personal side of Lippmann's fear of mass
society.
In acknowledging the pain and aimlessness
that is part of life for the forgotten multitudes,
Lippmann implied, that he would drive himself hard to
avoid that despairing existence.

25 PtP, 241.

26

PtP, 242.
This was written i n '"1913, before Lenin and the
Bolsheviks had to confront this problem.
Some of Marx's
thoughts on the proletarian revolution and that which
follows it are found in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844, which were not published in full until 1932.
Lippmann, at any rate, would neither have read them nor
cared what they said. After the October Revolution,
Marx stood or fell, as far as Lippmann was concerned,
by the successes or failures of the Communist Party,
USSR.
After the Bolshevik Revolution, Lippmann wrote:
“Lenin completely abandoned the materialistic interpretation
of politics.
Had he held sincerely to the Marxian
formula when he seized power in 1917, he would have said
to himself: according to the teachings of Marx, socialism
will develop out of a mature capitalism...here am I, in
control of a nation that is only entering upon a capitalist
development...it follows that for the present all idea
of a socialist republic is out of the question...we must
advance capitalism in order that the evolution which
Marx predicted may take place.
But Lenin did nothing of
the sort.
Instead of waiting for evolution to evolve,
he tried by will, force, arid education, to defy the

-83historical process which his philosophy assumed."
(P0f 119)
Lenin, interestingly, from 1894 to almost the
date of the Revolution, did believe that the role of
the proletariat was to help the bourgeoisie overthrow
the Tsar and establish a democracy.
As late as April
1917 the Bolsheviks believed themselves to be in the
middle of a bourgeois revolution. At that point,
Lenin declared that Russia had passed from the first
stage of the revolution, which placed power in the
hands of the bourgeoisie, to the second stage, "which
must place power in the hands of the proletariat and
the poorest sections of the peasants."
(V. Lenin,
"The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution,"
quoted in David McLellan, Marxism After Mar x . New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1979, pp. 93-94.)
27 PO, 116.
28 PO, 118.
29 PO, 119.
Putting aside Lippmann's intentionally truncated reading
of Marx's "economic determinism," it must be pointed out
that the tide of opinion among western Marxists has
moved away from the "hard" determinism of the Second
International, a view which did indeed claim that the
transformation of the forces of production would transform
all social relations.
There would be a certain amount
of plausibility to the argument that Lippmann responded
primarily to this rather mechanistic Marxism.
However, it is clear that Marx and Engels themselves
did not argue that noneconomic phenomena are uniquely
determined by the economic order.
Engels, for instance,
tried specifically to guard against this oversimplification
of their views:
"According to the materialist conception
of history, the ultimately determining element in history
is the production and reproduction of real life. More
than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted.
Hence
if somebody twists this into saying that the economic
element is the only determining one, he transforms that
proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless
phrase.
The economic situation is the basis, but the
various elements of the superstructure: political forms
of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions
established by the victorious class after a successful
battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes
of all thesje actual struggles in the brains of the
participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories,

-84religious views and their further development into systems
of dogmas, also exercise their influence upon the course
of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate
in determining their form.
There is an interaction of
all these elements in whic, amid all the endless host of
accidents (that is, of things and events, whose inner
connection is so remote or so impossible of proof that
we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible) the
economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary."
(Engels, "Letters on Historical Materialism," in The
Marx-Engels Reader, Second Edition, edited by Robert C.
Tucker.
Hew York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1978,
p. 760.)
Lenin, after his lengthy study of Hegel, strove to
refute simple materialism.
"Man's consciousness," he
said at one point, "not only reflects the objective world
but creates it."
(Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks,
quoted in McLellan, p. 108.)
Gramsci wrote that economic events "simply create
a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain
modes of thought, and certain ways of resolving questions
involving the entire subsequent development of national
life."
(Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison
Notebooks, quoted in McLellan, p. 187.)
31

PO, 119.
Contrary to Lippmann's hyperbolic assertion,
Marx never said that economic position supplies a class
with "a coherent policy" for obtaining its interests.
Instead, Marx introduced several concepts to explain -why
true class consciousness does not suddenly appear
imprinted on the inside of one's forehead.
Consciousness
always grows in a dialectical relationship with the
material.
Instead of being a one-sidedly favorable
relationship, it also produces obstructions to class
consciousness, such as the fetishism of commodities
(a concept which shows how capitalist commodity production
makes direct social relations between individuals appear
to be social relations between things.
Much of 20th century Marxism, most notably the work
of Lukacs, Gramsci and the critical theorists, has
delved into the difference between the actual
consciousness of the proletariat and the consciousness
it would have if it were fully aware of its own
interests.
The praxis of these thinkers and others
has concentrated on making individuals within the
working class subjectively conscious of their role in history.

-8532 PO, 119. Again, contrary to Lippmann's assertion that Marx
posited each member of a class with an identical conception of
the class interest, Engels wrote, "For what each individual
wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is
something that no one willed." (Engels, "Letters on Historical
Materialism," in Tucker, p. 761.)
33 PO, 118.
34 PO, 118, 117.
35 PO, 121.
36 PO, 120.
37 MF, 6.
38 DM, 109.
39 PtP, 317.
40 MF, 113.
41 GS, 117.
42 GS, 205. Lippmann, eschewed rigorous definition of key terms
and instead simply repeated them until they rang with
familiarity.
43 GS, 168. Lippmann never claimed that the world market went
peacefully into the lives of the underdeveloped nations of the
world. He thought that it was usually established by blood
and force. Once in place, however, the market brings
civilization to the heathens (and eventually the imperialists
wither away). Marx, too, thought that the subjugation of
lesser developed societies would eliminate their backward
aspects, but he also remained critical of the globalization
of markets: "In history up to the present it is certainly an
empirical fact that separate individuals have, with the
broadening of their activity into world-historical activity,
become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them...a
power which has become more and more enormous and, in the last
instance, turns out to be the world market." (Marx, The
German Ideology, in Tucker, pp. 163-164.)
44 GS, 205. Marx, too, held the division of labor to be a
crucial category, although unlike Lippmann he saw it
developing dialectically. The division of labor, Marx wrote,
"implies the fact that intellectual and material activity —
enjoyment ad labour, production and consumption — devolve on
different individuals, and that the only possibility of their
not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn
of the division of labour....
"With the division of labour, in which all these

-86contradictions are implicit... is given simultaneously the
distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both
quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products,
hence property....
"Further, the division of labour implies the
contradiction between the interest of the separate individual
or the individual family and the communal interest of all
individuals who have intercourse with one another.... And
finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of
how, as long as man remains in na'tural society, that is, as
long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the
common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not
voluntarily, but naturally, divided man's own deed becomes an
alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of
being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of
labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive
sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which
he cannot escape. He is a hunte, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a
critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to
lose his means of livelihood.... This fixation of social
activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into
an objective power above us, growing out of our control,
thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our
calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical
development up till now." (Marx, The German Ideology, in
Tucker, pp. 159-160.)
Marx developed the relationship between property-owner
and propertyless as the fundamental antagonism within the
capitalist division of labor. Lippmann, in contrast, found no
inherent antagonisms within the division of labor. Lippmann
also ignored the harmful effects of the "fixation" of
individuals to a particular function in the division of labor.
This imprisonment of individuals within a certain production
niche is, as John McMurtry argues, not necessary for the
increased productivity of labor. The technological necessity
of the division of tasks (the need "to position labor-power x
in place y for t . ....tn ") can be fulfilled in other ways,
"such as taking turns...." The "riveting" of a particular
person to one job "for all of t1
tn " is "a function of
the economic structure," not of technology, and can be
eliminated, once capitalist economic organization is left
behind. (John McMurtry, The Structure of Marx's World-View.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 69, 80.)
45 GS, 166.
46 GS, 212.
47 GS, 168.
48 GS, 207..
49 GS, 357.

-8750 G S , 207.
51 GS, 204.
52 GS, 207.
53 MF, 23-24.
54 MF, 90.
55 MF, 105.
56 MF, 95.
57 MF, 96-97.
58 ^p, 99 - 1 0 0 . Lippmann's argument here completely contradicts
Steel's assertion that the mature Lippmann ignored "the
central question of economic.power." (Steel, p. 3 24.)
Lippmann repeatedly stressed that his attack was aimed at
excessive plutocratic "power" and proletarian instability.
He stated that "the inordinate accumulation of property means
an inordinate accumulation of power," and refers to the
plutocracy as "those who have more income than they need for
their personal use and enjoyment." Their wealth is used as "an
instrument of power exercised generally for the accumulation
of more wealth and more power." (MF, 96.)
It was, in fact, Steel who ignored something.— the- depth
of Lippmann's commitment to the economic analysis of society.
59 GS, 40.
60 This final argument of Lippmann's closely paralleled the
more deterministic Marx. "Men never relinquish the social form
in which they have acquired certain productive forces. On the
contrary, in order that they not be deprived of the result
attained, and forfeit the fruits of civilization, they are
obliged from the moment when the form of their commerce no
longer corresponds to the productive forces acquired, to
change all their traditional social forms." (Marx, "Letter to
Annenkov," in McMurtry, p. 206.) McMurtry interpreted Marx to
say that "the development of productive forces always holds or
advances, and never regresses." (McMurtry, p. 232.)
Marx, of course, at times believed — in Lippmann's terms
— that the time had come when the existing social order could
no longer adapt itself to the economy.
61 GS, 205.
62 GS, 209. This change in technology will be realized in one
of two fashions: (1) Through a "revolutionary advance in the
logical powers of men" which makes possible "a planned society
consciously directed." (GS, 34,33.) (2) Through a
revolutionary series of inventions which enable men "by their

-88own self-sufficient effort to achieve a more satisfactory
standard of life than they now aspire to." Lippmann suggested
two possibilities: (a) "a machine that would with a little
muscular energy produce food, clothes, shelter, comfrots, and
luxuries out of any soil and a little sunshine;" or (b) "a
medicine which would make men cease to want the diversified
products of modern industry." (GS, 209.)
As impoverished as this view of the future may be, it
bears further examination. Lippmann claimed that mankind
arose in a "meagre and self-sufficing existence," passed
through a stage o increasing interdependence and diminishing
necessity (the present), and eventually will enter the future.
The possibilities he offered for what lies in wait are totally
contradictoy. The first possibility is a "consciously
directed," hence, interdependent and- (it is reasonable to
assume) somewhat centralized society that (he implied) is at
least as materially productive as the present. The second
possibility is a society that lies in the opposite direction.
Within it, people live independent, self-sufficient lives, not
consciously directed, interdependent or centralized. The
standard of living in this society would be superior to that
of the present. The sub-possibilities within this arrangement
are, again, totally contradictory: The first is that men would
be able to satisfy all their desires with a minimum of labor,
and, thus, the standard of living improves. The second is that
men, with the help of a potion, learn to control their
desires, thus, the standard of living falls, but no one
notices the difference. These two sub-possibilities are
familiar categories within Lippmann's world view. They may be
regarded as little more than the good/bad view of human
nature, projected onto a technological background. In the
first sub-possibility, human nature is regarded as essentially
good and hence allowed to fulfill its desires; in the second,
it is bad and hence must be restrained. The second view, most
assuredly, is that of the mature Lippmann. The bad, irrational
side of man must be denied. The question, always, is how and
by whom?
63 GS, 168.
64 GS, 209. Lippmann, like John Stuart Mill, held the
distribution of income to be unrelated to the mode of
production. It could and should be altered. However, Lippmann
was not particularly clear about the standard to which it
should conform.
GS,232. Since Lippmann absolved the economy from any claim
to justice or rationality, the appearance of irrationality or
injustice is only a problem in people's minds. However, even
though such opinions are false — since they do not agree with
"objective" reality — they are troubling in Lippmann's view
of things. If the wrong opinion is held by enough peopl, and
if those people act upon their opinion (through a democratic
government, for example), then that false opinion can change

-89reality.
itself.)

(Even though reality would eventually destroy

66 GS, 207.
67 GS, 209.
68 GS, 362-363.
88 GS, 358. It should become increasingly apparent that
Lippmann's interpretation of the essential elements of modern
capitalism was far from the views held by neoclassical
economists. For example, "necessitous bargaining," which
Lippmann included among "extrinsic and artificial causes of
inequality, would be considered an intrinsic aspect of the
economy by the neoclassicals and one which, when incorporated
under "voluntary exchange," leads to gains for both parties.
Necessitous bargaining (and indeed much of the division
of labor) refers to the advantage wielded by the capitalist
over the laborer; for the capitalist may allow the passage of
time (and the recurrence of business slumps) to exhaust the
worker's resources, forcing the worker to agree to a
"necessitous bargain."
Lippmann never endorsed competition, the sine qua non of
orthodox economics. In his early works he even argued that the
competitive ideal is retrogressive. In The Good Society he
ignored the matter.
70 DM, 143.
71 GS, 230.
72 GS, 227.
73 GS, 174.

Section II
1 Alf Ross, quoted in Paul E. Sigmund, Natural Law in
Political Thought. Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971',
p. 205.
2 PP, 135.
3 Sigmund, 205-207.
4 GS, 169-170, 347; PP, 106.
5 PP, 124.
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8 GS, 247;! PP, 101.
9 PP, 179--180.
10 GS, 337--338.
11 PP, 174--175.
12 GS, 347--348.
13 classical natural law principles are established by the
natural order of the universe and human society. Modern
natural law asserts the inevitability of conflict in the
desires and actions of humans and argues the necessity of
imposing order by human contrivance. (Sigmund, 80.) David Hume
is generally credited with making the most telling distinction
between the two views. He stated that natural law principles
are "not deriv'd from nature," but arise "artificially, t h o '
necessarily, from education, and human conventions." (David
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19 46 , P- 483 .)
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36 PP, 142.
37 PP, 153-154.
38 PP, 153-154.
39 GS, 334.
40 GS, 333.
41 PP, 134. Given Lippmann's generally contentious attitude
toward positivism — he typically regarded it as seriously
misguided but salvageable — and given the positivists'
misgivings about pragmatism, the notion of methodological
common round existing under natural law seems wishful at best.
Pushed on the matter, Lippmann would probably state that the
necessary consensus would not be that difficult to secure.
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Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 426.
8 9 Rawls, p. 428.
'

Sigmund, 209-210.

Section III
1 The formal-legal synthesis, which was standard fare well
into the twentieth century (and may still be, depending upon
the sympathies of one's informants), studies the law (hence,
"legal") and formal government organization (hence, "formal").
It places extraordinary influence on constitutional and
quasi-constitutional materials and is "less concerned with
what people do in government than with the nature of the legal
rules that govern their functioning." (Harry Eckstein, "On the
'Science' of the State," Daedalus, Vol. 108, No. 4, Fall 1979,
pp. 2-3.)
2 Eckstein, 9.
3 Michael Curtis, The Great Political Theories: Vol. 2. New
York: Avon Books, 1981, p. 425.
4 Robert Ezra Park, American Journal of Sociology, quoted on
back cover of Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion. New York: The
Free Press, 1965.
5 Steel, 180.
6 Instead, several competing paradigms, each controversial in

-94its own, vie among one another for the consensus necessary
if any one of them is to gain dominance. Each competitor holds
— of course — that it is a scientific approach. Paul
Lazarsfeld, for example, claims that "public opinion reseach
has become an empirical science." (Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Public
Opinion and the Classical Tradition," The Public Opinion
Quarterly, Vol.. XXI, No. I, Spring 195 7, p. 40.)
7 In fact, The Public Philosophy called for the renewal of
what Lippmann described in places as a divinely inspired
natural law. A fraction of this natural law, he claimed, had
been distilled in American constitutional materials. His
position had seemingly come full circle (on a higher level) to
an inspired version of the formal-legalism he had ridiculed
forty years earlier.
8 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent
and End of Civil Government. 1690, Chapter IV, Section 22.
9 This general argument is developed by Sheldon S. Wolin,
Politics and Vision. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960,
pp. 346-347, 293-297. Wolin's interpretation, which is
slightly different than the argument made here, does not
mention Lippmann.
10 Wolin, 293.
11 Henry Kariel, "Shifting with Art," Polity, XII, No. 1, p. 9.
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2 6 a s Lippmann aged, his opinion of human nature grew more
negative, as was discussed in Section II.
27 po, 120-121. Lippmann cites here the work of William
McDougall, in Social Psychology, Introduction, Fourth Edition.
28 po, 230.
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30 PO, 121.
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32 Lippmann, The Phantom Public. New York: MacMillan, 1925, p.
20, quoted in Steel, p. 212.
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34 Contrary to Lippmann's assertion, politics brought to bear
on the economy does not necessarily produce outmoded forms of
economic organization. In fact, the recent collapse of the
U.S. steel industry demonstrated how the opposite can be true:
U.S. business leaders, basing their decisions on shortterm,
"economic" considerations, stalled he upgrading of steel
manufacturing technology; meanwhile, political leaders in
other countries helped push their steel industries ahead with
extensive modernization programs.
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40 McMurtry
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46 PO, 60.
47 PO, 63.
48 PO, 64.
49 PO, 65.
50 PO, 65.
51 PO, 65-66.
52 PO, 72-73 .
53 PO, 75.
54 PO, 65-66.
55 it would have been inconsistent for Lippmann to have
described the stereotypes of the masses as naturally
antagonistic to the dominant stereotype. To do so would imply
a class-divided society, something which Lippmann maintained
did not exist. However, the thrust of his argument in Public
Opinion leads one to the conclusion that the opinions of the
majority threaten the nation’s governability, and that there
is some cohesion operating in these opinions — a force
similar, perhaps, to Gramsci's concept of hegemony.
56 Lippmann, "Blazing Publicity," Vanity Fair, September 1927,
quoted in Steel, pp. 218-219.
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